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Variations on a Theme: Corporate Law in 
Latin America, Continental Europe, and 
the United States 
Ángel R. Oquendo* 
The regulation of incorporated companies in Latin America 
and Continental Europe appears to distance itself from that 
in the United States. It differs in how it structures itself and 
handles incorporation, incorporators, piercing, govern-
ance, discipline, and shareholders. In their regulatory exer-
tions, both regimes rely, certainly, on legislation and adju-
dication yet do so differently, qualitatively in addition to 
quantitatively. 
Apparently, civil and common law continue to specialize 
respectively though not exclusively in statutes and binding 
precedents. Still, they ever more frequently intrude into 
each other’s apparent specialty, while leaving their own 
imprint on it. The tendency to converge coexists with that to 
diverge. 
This general difference, in tandem with the correlative con-
currence, has evolved immemorially, growing in nuances 
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and exceptions. Absent unexpected cataclysms, it should 
persist down this path into the future. So will its more spe-
cific counterparts, highlighted throughout the following 
discussion. They equally insinuate a somewhat tentative, 
simplistic, distortive picture of contrasts and similarities. 
So depicted, the Latin American and Continental Europe 
scheme seems to foment jurisdictional diversity, concen-
trate on compliance, enthrone an ever-present state, evoke 
the concept of the collective good, and dedicate itself to 
stakeholders. On the other hand, the U.S. model appears to 
compel convergence among competing jurisdictions, focus 
on flexibility or user-friendliness, kowtow to an all-
powerful corporation (or directorate), wave the flag of in-
dividualism or efficiency, and consecrate itself to stock-
holders. Expectedly, this seeming opposition on specifics 













Corporate law seems to operate differently in Latin America 
and Continental Europe compared to the United States. It appears 
to possess one set of institutions and procedures on one side of the 
divide and another one on the other. Surely, these appearances may 
ultimately amount to nothing but deception. They may deceptively 
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rest on an overplay of the dissimilarities between and an underplay 
of those within the juxtaposed realms. Nevertheless, this work will 
attempt to show the apparent contrast between the two as real and 
as partly based on their contrasting traditional heritages. 
In all, the underlying traditions seem to diverge most conspicu-
ously in their approach to legislation and adjudication. Certainly, 
they appear not to differ as they (supposedly) did over a century 
ago. The civil- and common-law systems do not seem anymore to 
derive all their legal precepts from, respectively, statutory and case 
law. Notwithstanding, they do appear to treat these two sources 
somewhat dissimilarly. 
In Latin American and Continental European jurisdictions, the 
statute seems to play a prominent though not solitary role as an all-
encompassing norm. It ordinarily contains jam-packed sections 
that seemingly suggest the different parts of a complex rule and 
that commentators or adjudicators might break down into subsec-
tions for purposes of interpretation. The whole arrangement ap-
pears to aspire to arrive in advance at specific solutions for con-
crete cases. 
In the United States, an enactment may govern at the forefront 
yet in a fairly fragmented fashion. It seems to consist of various 
disconnected components that neither mesh fully nor cover the 
entire field. They appear to be waiting for the judiciary to step in as 
an interpreter who might contribute some coherence. 
Furthermore, reasoned judgments generally seem not to set 
binding precedents, particularly for the supreme adjudicative or-
gan, within the so-called Romano-Germanic universe. Nonethe-
less, they come across as carrying more than persuasive weight, 
inching toward their counterparts from the Anglo-American ambit. 
Their persuasiveness appears to grow in the slightly technical area 
presently at stake. Of course, their compulsion apparently attaches 
to the final resolution rather than the opinion as an entirety and 
does not imply a shift toward stare decisis. 
The present discussion will traverse several subtopics. It will 
submit that they seem to illustrate the mentioned divergences, albe-
it imperfectly. Concurrently, other differences will rise to the fore. 
For instance, the U.S. corporative scene features a family of 
federally compartmentalized and substantively overlapping 
schemes. It pushes them to compete against each other either to 
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favor the incorporator as much as possible or, depending on the 
analytical perspective, to enable her to run her corporation effi-
ciently to the utmost. The Delawarean alternative appears to have 
triumphed in the competition.1 
The nations in Latin America and Continental Europe can 
hardly foster a comparable contest. They traditionally proffer only 
one regime and do not invite businesses headquartered extraterrito-
rially to incorporate nationally. Still, the overall model could culti-
vate diversity as opposed to convergence. Simultaneously, it 
should continue to permit concerns to remain competitive interna-
tionally. 
On a separate front, the Latin American or Continental Europe-
an paradigm seems to involve the state more, whether directly 
through judges or comptrollers or indirectly through a lawyerly 
notary who assures compliance with the law. It also appears to al-
low greater representation of stakeholders, such as creditors or 
workers, through the internal-control bodies within the enterprise. 
The analysis will alternatively focus on Argentina and Germa-
ny, with occasional references to France and other countries, and 
mostly though not exclusively on Delaware. It will paint a general 
picture alongside a detailed juxtaposition of the Argentine, Ger-
man, and Delawarean configuration of companies. Hopefully, the 
pictorial details will not cloud but instead illuminate the landscape 
behind. 
STRUCTURE 
Throughout Latin America and Continental Europe, individuals 
may set up a business and render themselves but restrictedly re-
sponsible.2 In other words, they may invest in an enterprise and 
                                                                                                             
 1 See SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, 264 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1236 (N.D. 
Okla. 2017) (“Delaware is the prevailing corporate domicile of choice.”) (quot-
ing E. Norman Veasey, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Gov-
ernance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1399, 1408 (2005)). 
 2 See, e.g., Ley [L.] 19550 art. 163 (Arg.) (1984) (“El capital [en la socie-
dad anónima] se representa por acciones y los socios limitan su responsabilidad 
a la integración de las acciones suscriptas.”); CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO [CD. COM.] 
art. 122(3) (Cuba) (“[En la compañía mercantil] anónima . . . forman[] el fondo 
común los asociados por parte o porciones ciertas, figuradas por acciones o de 
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risk solely the capital that they contribute. Their personal assets 
usually remain immune from claims or judgments against the un-
dertaking. 
To achieve such investment and immunity, an investor must 
launch either an “anonymous” or a “limitedly liable” “society.”3 
The former formula prevails in romance-language cultures to de-
nominate what U.S. lawyers call “corporations.”4 The latter, three-
term formulation refers to what state lawmakers in the United 
States designate “limited liability companies,”5 maybe under Con-
tinental European influence. 
                                                                                                             
otra manera indubitada, [y] encargan su manejo a mandatarios o administradores 
amovibles que representen a la Compañía bajo una denominación apropiada al 
objeto o empresa a que se destine sus fondos.”); Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock 
Law] § 1(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Aktiengesellschaft ist eine Gesellschaft mit 
eigener Rechtspersönlichkeit. Für die Verbindlichkeiten der Gesellschaft haftet 
den Gläubigern nur das Gesellschaftsvermögen.”); AktG § 1 (Austria) (1965) 
(“Die Aktiengesellschaft ist eine Gesellschaft mit eigener Rechtspersönlichkeit, 
deren Gesellschafter mit Einlagen auf das in Aktien zerlegte Grund-kapital 
beteiligt sind, ohne persönlich für die Verbindlichkeiten der Gesellschaft zu 
haften”). 
 3 L. 19550 ch. II, § IV (“DE LA SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD 
LIMITADA”) & § V (“DE LA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA”) (Arg.) (1984). 
 4 See CODE DE COMMERCE [CD. COM.] art. L225-1 (Fr.) (Modified by LOI 
2016-563 art. 2 (2016)) (“La société anonyme est la société dont le capital est 
divisé en actions et qui est constituée entre des associés qui ne supportent les 
pertes qu’à concurrence de leurs apports.”); REAL DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 
1/2010 art. 1(1) (Spain) (2010) (“Son sociedades de capital la sociedad de res-
ponsabilidad limitada, la sociedad anónima y la sociedad comanditaria por ac-
ciones.”); CÓDIGO DAS SOCIEDADES COMERCIAIS [CD. SCDS, COMS.], Decreto-
Lei 262/86 art. 271 (Port.) (1986) (“Na sociedade anónima o capital é dividido 
em acções e cada sócio limita a sua responsabilidade ao valor das acções que 
subscreveu.”). Cf. AktG § 1 (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Aktiengesellschaft ist eine 
Gesellschaft mit eigener Rechtspersönlichkeit.”); AktG § 1 (Austria) (1965) 
(“Die Aktiengesellschaft ist eine Gesellschaft mit eigener Rechtspersönlichkeit 
. . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1 [Del. Gen. Corp. L.], §§ 1-619 (2018) 
(“Delaware General Corporation Law”). 
 5 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, ch. 8, §§ 18-101-1208 (2018) (“Limited 
Liability Company Act”). See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, & 
RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 804-05 (8th ed. 
2013) (“The first statute authorizing a limited liability company (LLC) was 
adopted in Wyoming in 1977 . . . . By 1999 all 50 states had adopted LLC stat-
utes.”). 
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Before the development of such second category, the first 
seems to have encompassed all U.S. firms of restricted responsibil-
ity, regardless of size or style. Frequently, it ended up itself bifur-
cating into two: one for larger more complex concerns, one for 
smaller simpler ones.6 Perhaps prototypically, Delaware devotes 
“Subchapter XIV” of its corporate statute to “Close Corpora-
tions.”7 It targets establishments avowing themselves as such, fea-
turing fewer than thirty shareholders, constraining share transfers, 
and abstaining from public offerings.8 
Pursuant to the pertinent provisions, stockholders may manage 
the venture themselves, operate it as a partnership, or agree to em-
power each other to dissolve it.9 Moreover, they may curb direc-
torial discretion.10 In this jurisdiction, the bench has passed on 
election agreements,11 in addition to voting trusts.12 In others, it 
has debated restrictions on transferring stock,13 as well as on the 
board’s leeway,14 and dissolutions upon a deadlock.15 
Like many civil-law societies, Argentina prescribes a single 
structure for all incorporated enterprises. It does not supply a sepa-
rate statutory scheme for closed ones.16 Yet its legislation does 
treat them differently now and then. 
                                                                                                             
 6 See CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 725 (“[M]ore than half 
enacted statutory provisions designed specifically to authorize certain control 
mechanisms for close corporations.”). 
 7 Del. Gen. Corp. L., Subchapter XIV (“Close Corporations; Special Provi-
sions”), §§ 341-56. See id. § 341 (“This subchapter applies to all close corpora-
tions.”). 
 8 Id. §§ 343(a), 342(a). See also id. §§ 344-46. 
 9 Id. §§ 351, 354-55. 
 10 Id. § 350. 
 11 See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947); E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 62 
N.W.2d 288 (Neb. 1954). 
 12 See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957); Lehrman v. 
Cohen. 222 A.2d 800 (Del. 1966). 
 13 See, e.g., Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 141 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1957); 
Rafe v. Hindin. 288 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1968). 
 14 See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934); Clark v. 
Dodge199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936). 
 15 See, e.g., Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc., 77 N.W.2d 389 (Wis. 
1956). 
 16 See ANA MARÍA MEIROVICH DE AGUINIS, EMPRESAS E INVERSIONES EN EL 
MERCOSUR: SOCIEDADES Y JOINT VENTURES: ESTABLECIMIENTO DE SUCURSAL Y 
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Concretely, The Comptroller does not ordinarily oversee such 
entities,17 in contradistinction to their bigger brothers, except for 
their “constitutive contract” and their amendments to it.18 Still, she 
may police them more comprehensively upon a demand by an in-
vestor “with ten percent of” their stock or by a “trustee,”19 or when 
she justifiably resolves that she must do so “in defense of the pub-
lic interest.”20 Close corporations (as opposed to open ones) must 
not deliver documentation to the National Securities Commission 
or announce all their shareholder meetings and preferential pur-
chase-rights in a major newspaper.21 They may not “distribute an-
ticipated or provisional interests or dividends” or unlimitedly 
                                                                                                             
FILIAL: INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS: IMPUESTOS 278 (1992) (“La sociedad anó-
nima no admite subtipos, esto es, no responde a diferentes regímenes legales 
según fuere abierta o cerrada, de familia u otras variantes que ofrece el derecho 
extranjero.”). 
 17 L. 19550 art. 299(1) (Arg.) (1984) (“Las asociaciones anónimas . . . que-
dan sujetas a la fiscalización de la autoridad de contralor . . . en cualquiera de los 
siguientes casos: (1) Hagan oferta pública de sus acciones o debentures . . . .”). 
 18 Id. art. 300 (“La fiscalización por la autoridad de contralor de las socie-
dades anónimas no incluidas en el artículo 299, se limitará al contrato constituti-
vo, sus reformas y variaciones del capital . . . .”). 
 19 Id. art. 301(1) (“La autoridad de contralor podrá ejercer funciones de 
vigilancia en las sociedades anónimas no incluidas en el artículo 299 . . . : (1) 
Cuando lo soliciten accionistas que representen el diez por ciento (10 %) del 
capital suscripto o lo requiera cualquier síndico.”). 
 20 Id. art. 301(2) (“La autoridad de contralor podrá ejercer funciones de 
vigilancia en las sociedades anónimas no incluidas en el artículo 299 . . . : (2) 
Cuando lo considere necesario, según resolución fundada, en resguardo del inte-
rés público.”). 
 21 See id. art. 62 (“La Comisión Nacional de Valores, otras autoridades de 
contralor y las bolsas, podrán exigir a las sociedades incluidas en el artículo 299, 
la presentación de un estado de origen y aplicación de fondos por el ejercicio 
terminado, y otros documentos de análisis de los estados contables.”); id. art. 
237 (“Las asambleas serán convocadas por publicaciones . . . en el diario de 
publicaciones legales. Además, para las sociedades a que se refiere el artículo 
299, en uno de los diarios de mayor circulación general de la República.”); id. 
art. 194 (“La sociedad hará el ofrecimiento [de nuevas acciones de la misma 
clase en proporción a las que poseen] a los accionistas mediante avisos por tres 
(3) días en el diario de publicaciones legales y además en uno de los diarios de 
mayor circulación general en toda la República cuando se tratare de sociedades 
comprendidas en el artículo 299.”). 
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“augment” their total “capital” without amending their bylaws.22 
Lastly, their stockholders need not appoint a minimum of three 
directors nor a collegial trustee-panel or a supervisory council.23 
Likewise, German nonpublic corporate firms may require of 
their councilors only one “yearly session” instead of the usual 
two.24 They enjoy a tad wider wiggle-room in scheduling their 
shareholder assemblies and normally need not notarize the ap-
proved regular resolutions.25 Finally, an “organization” that knows 
its investors “by name” may convoke them simply “by registered 
mail.”26 
Argentine and German authorities may believe that such ex-
emptions or prohibitions suffice. They may have never felt a burn-
ing desire for a specialized codification anyway. After all, their 
overarching Romano-Germanic realm has offered from time 
(seemingly) immemorial the option of simpler and cozier unincor-
porated companies that afford abridged answerability. So, it ap-
                                                                                                             
 22 Id. art. 224 (“Está prohibido distribuir intereses o dividendos anticipados 
o provisionales o resultantes de balances especiales, excepto en las sociedades 
comprendidas en el artículo 299.”) & 188 (“En las sociedades anónimas autori-
zadas a hacer oferta pública de sus acciones, la asamblea puede aumentar el 
capital sin límite alguno ni necesidad de modificar el estatuto.”). 
 23 Id. art. 255 (“En las sociedades anónimas del artículo 299, salvo en las 
previstas en el inciso (7), el directorio se integrará por lo menos con tres directo-
res.”); id. art. 280 (“El estatuto podrá organizar un consejo de vigilancia . . . .”); 
id. art. 284 (“Cuando la sociedad estuviere comprendida en el artículo 299 —
excepto su inciso (2.)— la sindicatura debe ser colegiada en número impar.”). 
 24 See AktG § 110(3) (Ger.) (1965) (“Der Aufsichtsrat muss zwei Sitzungen 
im Kalenderhalbjahr abhalten. In nichtbörsennotierten Gesellschaften kann der 
Aufsichtsrat beschließen, dass eine Sitzung im Kalenderhalbjahr abzuhalten 
ist.”). 
 25 Id. § 121 (7) (“Bei Fristen und Terminen, die von der Versammlung 
zurückberechnet werden, ist der Tag der Versammlung nicht mitzurechnen 
. . . .Bei nichtbörsennotierten Gesellschaften kann die Satzung eine andere 
Berechnung der Frist bestimmen.”); id. § 130(1) (“Jeder Beschluß der 
Hauptversammlung ist durch eine über die Verhandlung notariell 
aufgenommene Niederschrift zu beurkunden . . . .Bei nichtbörsennotierten 
Gesellschaften reicht eine vom Vorsitzenden des Aufsichtsrats zu 
unterzeichnende Niederschrift aus, soweit keine Beschlüsse gefaßt werden, für 
die das Gesetz eine Dreiviertel- oder größere Mehrheit bestimmt.”). 
 26 Id. § 121 (4) (“Sind die Aktionäre der Gesellschaft namentlich bekannt, 
so kann die Hauptversammlung mit eingeschriebenem Brief einberufen werden, 
wenn die Satzung nichts anderes bestimmt; der Tag der Absendung gilt als Tag 
der Bekanntmachung.”). 
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pears to have separately structured compact concerns all along. On 
this entire front, formal discrepancies evidently overlie substantive 
resemblances, which may themselves demand an explanation too. 
In fact, broadly shared needs, whether real or perceived, may 
have similarly shaped this field in different zones around the globe. 
They may have, in conjunction with bi- or multilateral collabora-
tion or coercion, generated the general convergences to which this 
Section has been alluding from the outset. In parallel, material di-
vergences seem to have instantly developed and gradually stead-
ied, perchance because of the underlying cultural differences. 
For sure, sometimes superficial similarities reveal deeper dis-
similarities. For instance, Argentina, like the United States, consti-
tutes a federal polity. Nevertheless, it has merely one Business Or-
ganizations Act.27 Unlike U.S. states, Argentine provinces do not 
pass their own enactments in this domain. Accordingly, enterprises 
in Argentina must follow the same basic norms independently of 
their provincial location. 
The other federated nations in the regions under comparison (to 
wit, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Mexico, and Venezuela) 
approach these matters analogously.28 They do not tender a corpo-
rative customer a range of regimes from which it may pick. It must 
put up with the parameters legislated countrywide. 
Europe’s Union, for its part, inhabits a federative universe of 
its own. On the one hand, it provides a legal framework within 
which companies active in two or more of its constituent countries 
and based in one of them may turn into a Societas Europea.29 On 
the other hand, its national units such as Italy, France, Poland, or 
Spain possess their own arrangements. They appear to boast more 
legislative and adjudicative engagement in this terrain than the 
mother ship. 
                                                                                                             
 27 L. 19550 arts. 163-307 (Arg.) (1984). 
 28 See AktG (Austria) (1965); CODE DES SOCIETES (Belg.) (2019); Lei 6404 
(Braz.) (1976); AktG (Ger.) (1965); Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, ch. 
V (“De la sociedad anónima”), arts. 87-206 (Mex.) (1934); CD. COM. § V (“De 
la Compañía Anónima”), arts. 242-244 (Venez.). 
 29 See Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of Oct. 8, 2001, On the Statute 
for a European Company (SE), 2001 O.J. L 294/1 art. 1 (“A company may be 
set up within the territory of the Community in the form of a European public 
limited-liability company (Societas Europaea or SE)”). 
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This whole configuration may come across as an invitation for 
incorporators to help themselves to any one of the nationally or 
continentally proffered paradigms. However, it might not permit 
such flexibility along U.S. lines. Apparently, organizations with 
their headquarters in one jurisdiction often may not be easily char-
tered in another one. For example, they must take up “domicile” in 
a German “locality,” as well as specify which in their “bylaws,” to 
incorporate in Germany.30 Of course, the European Court of Jus-
tice has commanded the “registration,” upon request, of commer-
cial concerns from any “member State” in any other one.31 The 
command holds even if they “conduct” none of their “business” in 
the former and all in the latter.32 
Arguably, the two sorts of vertically aligned sovereigns within 
U.S. federalism also rule side by side. They do so sub silentio, 
though. Once again, one of them—namely, the federation—has 
neither enacted its own code of commerce nor authorized entrepre-
neurs federally to promote prospective or existing corporations. 
Nonetheless, it has heavily regulated such entities since the 1930s 
through the backdoor of its securities laws and rules.33 Slowly but 
surely, this regulation might be relegating that through chartering. 
In sum, the nations on one or the other coast of the Rio Grande 
or the North Atlantic Ocean purportedly pursue a roughly identical 
end in this area. Notwithstanding, those that dwell within the civil-
law tradition present promotors with one model, or two in the case 
of Europe. In contrast, the United States parades fifty. Indeed, it 
seems to have facilitated headquartering, as well as founding, 
                                                                                                             
 30 See AktG § 5 (Ger.) (1965) (“Sitz”) (“Sitz der Gesellschaft ist der Ort im 
Inland, den die Satzung bestimmt.”). 
 31 Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, Case C-212/97, [1999] 
E.C.R. I-01459, ¶ 30 (“[T]he refusal of a Member State to register a branch of a 
company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State in which 
it has its registered office on the grounds that the branch is intended to enable 
the company to carry on all its economic activity in the host State, with the re-
sult that the secondary establishment escapes national rules on the provision for 
and the paying-up of a minimum capital, is incompatible with Articles 52 and 58 
of the Treaty, in so far as it prevents any exercise of the right freely to set up a 
secondary establishment . . . .”). See also id. ¶ 38, Operative Part. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77a et seq (2018); Securities Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78a et seq (2018). 
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businesses anywhere on its territory through its social and econom-
ic homogenization from the turn of the twentieth century on. 
Under these circumstances, U.S. states appear to have been 
competing against each other in a cutthroat market ever since. 
They might have driven many a corporation away if they had in-
sisted, in the manner of the German system today, that it reside in 
reality within their borders to incorporate. In 1933, Louis D. 
Brandeis observed a widespread removal of “safeguards” in an 
“eager [quest] for the revenue derived from the traffic in char-
ters.”34 He deplored a “race   . . .   not of diligence but of laxity.”35 
Starting around the 1980s, a number of “scholars” have openly 
objected to his observation or his lamentation. They have com-
mended such “competition” as conducive to “efficient changes that 
eliminated anachronistic elements of state . . . statutes without 
harming investors.”36 
At a distance from this debate, the Latin American and Euro-
pean Continents might want at some point to embrace diversity at 
an international or a transnational level. Upon each becoming more 
homogeneous socially and economically, they might seek to enable 
any mobile company to choose among the available alternatives 
the one that best suits its particular necessities. In response, it 
might base its choice, if legally incited to do so, on an ample array 
of principles and values, not just efficiency. Ultimately, the United 
States might itself learn from such an effort. 
INCORPORATION 
The discussed dialectic of convergences and divergences per-
meates not only the structure but also the particulars of common- 
and civil-law corporate regulation. Therefore, it lies at the heart of 
the setup solemnities. The Argentine, German, and U.S. experienc-
es will continue to guide the discussion. 
Throughout Latin American and Continental European territo-
ries, the corporation’s foundation seems to transpire typically 
                                                                                                             
 34 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557 (1933). 
 35 Id. at 559. 
 36 See CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 26. 
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through a notarized instrument.37 Argentina provides a case in 
point.38 So does Germany.39 
Contrary to her U.S. counterparts, the Romano-Germanic nota-
ry appears to play the role of an impartial attorney, beyond impar-
tially witnessing signatures.40 She may “draft” and “authenticate” 
as well as “receive” the documentation within her purview and 
must ensure their “conformity with the law.”41 Her engagement 
                                                                                                             
 37 See, e.g., AktG § 16(1) (Austria) (1965) (“Feststellung der Satzung”) 
(“Die Satzung muß in Form eines Notariatsakts festgestellt werden.”). 
 38 L. 19550 art. 165 (Arg.) (1984) (“La sociedad se constituye por instru-
mento público . . . .”). See also id. art. 4 (“El contrato por el cual se constituya o 
modifique una sociedad, se otorgará por instrumento público o privado.”). 
 39 AktG § 23(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Feststellung der Satzung”) (“Die Satzung 
muß durch notarielle Beurkundung festgestellt werden. Bevollmächtigte 
bedürfen einer notariell beglaubigten Vollmacht.”). See also id. § 30(1) (“Die 
Gründer haben den ersten Aufsichtsrat der Gesellschaft und den Abschlußprüfer 
für das erste Voll- oder Rumpfgeschäftsjahr zu bestellen. Die Bestellung bedarf 
notarieller Beurkundung.”). 
 40 See generally L. 12.990 art. 1(c) (Arg.) (1947) (“Para ejercer el notariado 
se requiere: . . . c) Tener título de escribano expedido por universidad nacional, 
provincial o privada, debidamente habilitado en el caso de estos dos últimos, con 
tal que su otorgamiento requiera estudios completos de la enseñanza media pre-
vios a los de carácter universitario, los que deberán abarcar la totalidad de las 
materias y disciplinas análogas a las que se cursen para la carrera de abogacía 
. . . .”); BUNDESNOTARORDNUNG (BNotO) § 5 (Ger.) (1937) (“Zum Notar darf 
nur bestellt werden, wer die Befähigung zum Richteramt nach dem Deutschen 
Richtergesetz erlangt hat.”); id. § 14(1) (“Der Notar . . . ist nicht Vertreter einer 
Partei, sondern unabhängiger und unparteiischer Betreuer der Beteiligten.”). Cf. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, ch. 43 (“Notaries Public”), § 4323 (2018) (“A notarial 
act may be performed within this State by the following persons: (1) A notary 
public of this State; (2) A judge, clerk or deputy clerk of any court of this State; 
(3) A person licensed to practice law in this State; (4) A person authorized by 
the law of this State to administer oaths; and (5) Any other person authorized to 
perform the specific act by the law of this State.” ). 
 41 L. 12.990 art. 10 (Arg.) (1947) (“El escribano de registro es el funciona-
rio público instituido para recibir y redactar y dar autenticidad, conforme a las 
leyes y en los casos que ellas autorizan, los actos y contratos que le fueran en-
comendados. Sólo a él compete el ejercicio del notariado.”). Cf. DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 29, ch. 43 (“Notaries Public”), § 4322(b) (2018) (“In taking a verifica-
tion upon oath or affirmation, the notarial officer must determine, either from 
personal knowledge of identity or from satisfactory evidence of identity, that the 
person appearing before the officer and making the verification is the person 
whose true signature is on the statement verified.”). 
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evidently enhances the extent of official control over the private 
transactions before her. 
The United States seems to stage a simpler process without any 
notarization. For instance, the latter concept features nowhere in 
the 119 pages of the applicable Delawarean code.42 Incorporators 
may simply sign “the certificate of incorporation, . . . under penal-
ties of perjury,” and file it.43 The Secretary of State, who collects, 
stores, but probably seldom peruses the documents, may “refuse[] 
[them] [for] error, omission or [any] other imperfection.”44 Not 
surprisingly, she faces “no liability” for “inaccurately, defectively, 
or erroneously”45 executed filings. 
Within governing regimes in Latin America and Europe, the 
mandatory notarial participation on substance seemingly signals 
the presence of the state. It appears to aim at assuring that citizens 
abide by the governmental mandate embodied in the enactments. 
In the U.S. model, individuals seem to embark upon a straightfor-
ward albeit somewhat bureaucratic operation pretty much on their 
own. 
These dual diametrically dissimilar standpoints confront each 
other. In the first, the authorities apparently define each civic right 
before them and oversee its enforcement. In the second, they out-
wardly recognize it as stemming from an extra- or a pre-political 
source, whether liberty or efficiency, and as calling for vindication 
through self-help or -service. 
The civil law seems to set itself apart on the rest of the for-
mation formalities too. The Argentine Congress has distinguished 
two main routes to incorporate a business.46 It has demanded a 
choice between them.47 
                                                                                                             
 42 See Del. Gen. Corp. L., §§ 1-619. 
 43 Id. § 101(a) (“Any person, . . . may incorporate . . . a corporation . . . by 
filing . . . a certificate of incorporation which shall be executed, acknowledged 
and filed . . . .”); 103 (For execution, “[t]he certificate of incorporation . . . shall 
be signed by the incorporator.); id. (The acknowledgement “requirement is satis-
fied by [t]he signature.”). 
 44 Id. § 103 (g). 
 45 Id. 
 46 L. 19550 art. 165 (Arg.) (1984) (“La sociedad se constituye por instru-
mento público y por acto único o por suscripción pública.”). 
 47 Id. 
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Most cleanly, the creation of the company and the acquisition 
of all the stock may occur at once though a “single act.”48 The 
“founders,” “the signatories [before a notary] of the constitutive 
contract,”49 must specify in it the terms, the classes and specific 
entitlements of shares, and the mechanics for the election of the 
directorial board and trustee panel.50 They must include the legisla-
tively indicated information—such as the identity of the sharehold-
ers, the organizational “denomination” and “domicile,” the “ob-
ject,” the amount of capital, the “duration” of the venture, and di-
verse details on management, monitoring, and meetings—in the 
same “instrument,”51 the equivalent of the U.S. “charter,” “certifi-
cate,” or “articles of incorporation.”52 
The incorporators may or may not attach the bylaws,53 known 
locally in Spanish as “the statute.”54 To consummate the “constitu-
tion,”55 they must docket the relevant documentation with the 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. art. 166 (“[S]e constituye por acto único . . . .”). 
 49 Id. (“Todos los firmantes del contrato constitutivo se consideran fundado-
res.”) ; id. art. 165 (“La sociedad se constituye por instrumento público y por 
acto único . . . .”). 
 50 Id. arts. 166(1) (“Si se constituye por acto único, el instrumento de consti-
tución contendrá . . . Respecto del capital social: la naturaleza, clases, modalida-
des de emisión y demás características de las acciones . . . .”), 166(3) (“Si se 
constituye por acto único, el instrumento de constitución contendrá . . . La elec-
ción de los integrantes de los órganos de administración y de fiscalización, fi-
jándose el término de duración en los cargos.”). 
 51 Id. art. 11 (“El instrumento de constitución debe contener . . . : 1) El 
nombre, edad, estado civil, nacionalidad, profesión, domicilio y número de do-
cumento de identidad de los socios. 2) La razón social o la denominación, y el 
domicilio de la sociedad . . . .3) La designación de su objeto, que debe ser preci-
so y determinado; 4) El capital social, que deberá ser expresado en moneda ar-
gentina, y la mención del aporte de cada socio . . . .5) El plazo de duración, que 
debe ser determinado; 6) La organización de la administración, de su fiscaliza-
ción y de las reuniones de socios . . . .”). 
 52 CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 234 n.34. 
 53 AGUINIS, supra note 16, at 280 (“Los estatutos de la sociedad anónima 
pueden o no integrar formalmente el acto fundacional . . . .”). 
 54 L. 19550 art. 68 (Arg.) (1984) (“el estatuto”). 
 55 Id. art. 167 (Se “[c]onforma . . . la constitución” después de la inscripción 
por el “Juez de Registro.”). 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 15 
 
Comptroller.56 The latter verifies it and forwards it to the “Registry 
Judge.”57 
Secondly, Argentina permits promoters to launch their concern 
by public subscription over a relatively prolonged period. To em-
bark upon this journey, they must draft a signed and notarized 
“foundational program” and submit it to the aforementioned of-
ficeholders.58 It should basically identify the promoting business-
persons, spell out the “basis of the bylaws,” inventory the sorts of 
stock, and reveal “the possible benefits and advantages that [the 
adventurers] have reserved for themselves.”59 The legislation de-
lineates the minimum requirements for the subscribers agree-
ment,60 as well as the duties of the bank placing the shares.61 
The “deadline” for subscribing may not “exceed three 
months.”62 If the effort fails due to insufficient committing inves-
tors, the banking institution must “immediately return” the depos-
ited funds.63 In case of success, the new corporation springs into 
existence with those who assumed a commitment as its stockhold-
ers. In the event of oversubscription, it must either “prorate,” or 
                                                                                                             
 56 Id. art. 167 (“El contrato constitutivo será presentado a la autoridad de 
contralor para verificar el cumplimiento de los requisitos legales y fiscales.”). 
 57 Id. art. 167 (“Conformada la constitución, el expediente pasará al Juez de 
Registro, quien dispondrá la inscripción si la juzgara procedente.”). 
 58 Id. art. 168 (“En la constitución por suscripción pública los promotores 
redactarán un programa de fundación por instrumento público o privado, que se 
someterá a la aprobación de la autoridad de contralor . . . .Aprobado el progra-
ma, deberá presentarse para su inscripción en el Registro Público de Comercio 
. . . .”); id. art. 170(5) (“Las firmas de los otorgantes deben ser autenticadas por 
escribano público u otro funcionario competente.”). 
 59 Id. art. 170 (“El programa de fundación debe contener: 1) Nombre, edad, 
estado civil, nacionalidad, profesión, número de documento de identidad y do-
micilio de los promotores; 2) Bases del estatuto; 3) Naturaleza de las acciones: 
monto de las emisiones programadas, condiciones del contrato de suscripción y 
anticipos de pago a que obligan; . . . 5) Ventajas o beneficios eventuales que los 
promotores proyecten reservarse.”). 
 60 Id. art. 172. 
 61 Id. arts. 170(4), 178. 
 62 Id. art. 171 (“El plazo de suscripción, no excederá de tres (3) meses 
. . . .”). 
 63 Id. art. 173. (“No cubierta la suscripción en el término establecido, los 
contratos se resolverán de pleno derecho y el banco restituirá de inmediato a 
cada interesado, el total entregado, sin descuento alguno.”). 
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“increase” its capital, to accept all offers when it organizationally 
meets.64 
Upon subscription, a comptrollership representative must chair 
the formative assembly with the “intervening bank” in attend-
ance.65 Shareholders collectively holding more than fifty percent of 
the stock must show up.66 They must decide by majority, with the 
support of at least a third of total capital.67 Though the bylaws may 
allow shares with up to fivefold the voting weight of ordinary 
stock,68 each share entitles its holder to one ballot during this open-
ing gathering.69 Then, the investors officially “constitute the organ-
ization,” approve the promotion, as well as the “bylaws,” consider 
the value of in-kind payments, install the “directors” and “trus-
tees,” or supervisory council, and so forth.70 
Germany, in turn, boasts its own version of the first procedural 
path. The charter must supply information on the “founders,” 
“stock,” and “paid capital.” The bylaws must inform about the cor-
poration’s “name,” “domicile,” “object,” and “managing board.”71 
                                                                                                             
 64 Id. art. 174 (“Cuando las suscripciones excedan . . . el monto previsto, la 
asamblea constitutiva decidirá su reducción a prorrata o aumentará el capital 
hasta el monto de las suscripciones.”). 
 65 Id. art. 176 (“La asamblea constitutiva debe celebrarse con presencia del 
banco interviniente y será presidida por un funcionario de la autoridad de contra-
lor . . . .”). 
 66 Id. art. 176 (“La asamblea constitutiva . . .quedará constituida con la mi-
tad más una de las acciones suscriptas.”). 
 67 Id. art. 177 (“Las decisiones se adoptarán por la mayoría de los suscripto-
res presentes que representen no menos de la tercera parte del capital suscripto 
con derecho a voto . . . .”). 
 68 Id. art. 216 (“Cada acción ordinaria da derecho a un voto. El estatuto 
puede crear clases que reconozcan hasta cinco votos por acción ordinaria.”). 
 69 Id. art. 177 (“Cada suscriptor tiene derecho a tantos votos como acciones 
haya suscripto . . . .”). 
 70 Id. art. 179 (“La asamblea resolverá . . . sobre los siguientes temas que 
deben formar parte del orden del día: 1) Gestión de los promotores 2) Estatuto 
social 3) Valuación provisional de los aportes no dinerarios, en caso de exis-
tir . . . .4) Designación de directores y síndicos o consejo de vigilancia en su 
caso; 5) Determinación del plazo de integración del saldo de los aportes en dine-
ro; 6) Cualquier otro asunto que el banco considerare de interés incluir en el 
orden del día . . . .”). 
 71 AktG § 23(2) (Ger.) (1965) (“Feststellung der Satzung”) (“In der 
Urkunde sind anzugeben 1. die Gründer; 2. bei Nennbetragsaktien der 
Nennbetrag, bei Stückaktien die Zahl, der Ausgabebetrag . . . ; 3. der eingezahlte 
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They must break down the various shares authorized yet may not 
accord any of them more than one vote.72 
After chartering the venture, the incorporators “establish” it 
through their “assumption of all shares.”73 They must additionally 
craft a “foundational report.”74 The document must account for 
“the appropriateness of the contributions in kind and of those in 
exchange for assets.”75 It must disclose any advantaging of manag-
ers or councilors.76 
Coincidentally, these corporate officials “must review the exe-
cution of the foundation.”77 Moreover, they must, in concomitance 
with whoever founded the company, judicially “report” it “for in-
scription in the commercial register.”78 The registering “Court” 
must corroborate that “the organization’s establishment and regis-
tration unfolded appropriately.”79 
                                                                                                             
Betrag des Grundkapitals.”). See also id. § 23(3) (“Die Satzung muß bestimmen 
1. die Firma und den Sitz der Gesellschaft; 2. den Gegenstand des 
Unternehmens; . . . 3. die Höhe des Grundkapitals; 4. die Zerlegung des 
Grundkapitals entweder in Nennbetragsaktien oder in Stückaktien . . . ; 6. die 
Zahl der Mitglieder des Vorstands . . . .”). 
 72 Id. § 12(2) (“Mehrstimmrechte sind unzulässig.”). 
 73 Id. § 29 (“Mit der Übernahme aller Aktien durch die Gründer ist die 
Gesellschaft errichtet.”). 
 74 Id. § 32(1) (“Die Gründer haben einen schriftlichen Bericht über den 
Hergang der Gründung zu erstatten (Gründungsbericht).”). 
 75 Id. § 32(2) (“Im Gründungsbericht sind die wesentlichen Umstände 
darzulegen, von denen die Angemessenheit der Leistungen für Sacheinlagen 
oder Sachübernahmen abhängt.”). 
 76 Id. § 32(3) (“Im Gründungsbericht ist ferner anzugeben, ob und in 
welchem Umfang bei der Gründung für Rechnung eines Mitglieds des 
Vorstands oder des Aufsichtsrats Aktien übernommen worden sind und ob und 
in welcher Weise ein Mitglied des Vorstands oder des Aufsichtsrats sich einen 
besonderen Vorteil oder für die Gründung oder ihre Vorbereitung eine 
Entschädigung oder Belohnung ausbedungen hat.”). 
 77 Id. § 33(1) (“Die Mitglieder des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats haben 
den Hergang der Gründung zu prüfen.”). 
 78 Id. § 36(1) (“Die Gesellschaft ist bei dem Gericht von allen Gründern und 
Mitgliedern des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats zur Eintragung in das 
Handelsregister anzumelden.”). 
 79 Id. § 38(1) (“Das Gericht hat zu prüfen, ob die Gesellschaft 
ordnungsgemäß errichtet und angemeldet ist.”). 
18 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1 
 
German promoters “must appoint the supervisory council . . . 
and the annual auditor” for the first year.80 They must do so with 
“notarial authentication.”81 The councilors designate “the direc-
torate.”82 
Expectedly, Delaware streamlines the whole routine: “Any 
[natural or juridical] person, . . . singly or jointly with others, . . . 
may incorporate or organize a corporation . . . by filing” the char-
ter.83 This instrument must mainly contain the enterprise’s “name,” 
its “address,” the “nature of [its] business or purposes,” the types 
and numbers of its “stock,” and the contact information of its 
founders.84 
“After the filing of the certificate . . . , a majority of the incor-
porators” of the board must “call” an organizational “meeting.”85 It 
must notify everybody who may attend, except whoever has 
waived notification. The attendees must “adopt[] bylaws, elect[] 
directors” and “officers” to any vacancies, “do[] any . . . further 
acts to perfect the organization,” “and transact[]” any other matter 
that “may [crop]” up.86 Likewise, “most states” require promoters 
to meet to these ends.87 
German and the U.S. lawmakers appear not to have legislated 
the second procedure. Their French colleagues have, though.88 
They may have influenced the Argentine approach. Of course, a 
company in Germany or the United States might want to solicit 
and capitalize investments from subscribers. In all probability, it 
would do so on its own rather than under the watch of the admin-
istration. 
                                                                                                             
 80 Id. § 30(1) (“Die Gründer haben den ersten Aufsichtsrat der Gesellschaft 
und den Abschlußprüfer für das erste Voll- oder Rumpfgeschäftsjahr zu 
bestellen.”). 
 81 Id. (“Die Bestellung bedarf notarieller Beurkundung.”). 
 82 Id. § 30(4) (“Der Aufsichtsrat bestellt den ersten Vorstand.”). 
 83 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 101(a). 
 84 Id. § 102(a)(3). 
 85 See, e.g., id. § 108(a). 
 86 Id. 
 87 CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 237. 
 88 See CD. COM. Legislative Part, bk. II, tit. II, ch. V, § 1, Subsection 1 (“De 
la constitution avec offre au public”), arts. L225-2-L225-11-1 (Fr.) (“Il peut être 
stipulé par les statuts de toute société anonyme que celle-ci est régie par les dis-
positions de la présente sous-section.”). 
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To wrap up: The Latin American and Continental European 
paradigm, as opposed to its U.S. counterpart, engages functionar-
ies, whether from the Comptroller’s Office or the judiciary, in the 
foundational exertions, as well as notarization attorneys. In addi-
tion, it rests on a detailed codification instead of an open-ended 
one waiting for judicial interpretation. By and large, the state inter-
venes itself, in flesh and soul, not through intermediaries. 
INCORPORATORS 
In Argentina, incorporators must attach the label “sociedad 
anónima” (literally “anonymous society”) or “S.A.” to their select-
ed name.89 In Germany, they must write in the expression 
“‘Aktiengesellschaft [stock organization]’ or any generally under-
standable abbreviation.”90 Somewhat similarly, their U.S. counter-
parts must typically append a word such as “incorporated” at the 
end when naming the enterprise.91 
Omitting the reference formerly exposed Argentine sharehold-
ers to collective liability without limits.92 In all likelihood, the no-
tarial control would have caught and prevented any such mishap in 
the first place. With the passage of the 2016 Civil Code, the legis-
lature amended the relevant specialized Article and withdrew the 
mention of a sanction for the omission.93 It thus retreated from its 
earlier formalistic and draconian stance, tacitly encouraging a case-
by-case approach. 
                                                                                                             
 89 L. 19550 art. 164 (Arg.) (1984) (“La denominación social . . . debe con-
tener la expresión ‘sociedad anónima’, su abreviatura o la sigla S.A.”). 
 90 AktG § 4 (Ger.) (1965) (“Firma”) (“Die Firma der Aktiengesellschaft 
muß . . . die Bezeichnung ‘Aktiengesellschaft’ oder eine allgemein verständliche 
Abkürzung dieser Bezeichnung enthalten.”). 
 91 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 102(1) (“The name of the corporation . . . 
shall contain one of the words ‘association,’ ‘company,’ ‘corporation,’ ‘club,’ 
‘foundation,’ ‘fund,’ ‘incorporated,’ ‘institute,’ ‘society,’ ‘union,’ ‘syndicate,’ or 
‘limited,’ or one of the abbreviations . . . .”). 
 92 L. 19550 art. 164 (Arg.) (1984) (as originally enacted) (“La omisión de 
esta mención hará responsables ilimitada y solidariamente a los representantes 
de la sociedad juntamente con ésta, por los actos que celebren en esas condicio-
nes.”). 
 93 See CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), Annex II, § 2.22. 
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Prior to the completion of a single-act foundation in Argentina, 
the directorial officials may only obligate their company on under-
takings either needed for “its constitution” or linked to the “organi-
zational object” and “expressly” contemplated in the “constitutive 
act.”94 Nevertheless, they must sustain joint and unlimited respon-
sibility, along with the “founders” and the prospective business, for 
such exertions.95 So must all these parties, together with anyone 
else implicated, for any other actions in connection with the incor-
poration effort.96 
Upon registering the constituting “contract,” the concern re-
sponds all by itself for “necessary” and contractually consented-to 
promotional dealings.97 Moreover, the directorate may resolve that 
the corporation embrace any other engagements “up to three 
months after registration.”98 Any such embracement does not, 
however, exempt the engagers, founders, or “directors” from their 
own answerability.99 
Correlatively, the applicable Argentine statute pronounces 
“promotors jointly and unlimitedly liable” for any transaction prior 
                                                                                                             
 94 L. 19550 art. 183 (Arg.) (1984) (“Los directores solo tienen facultades 
para obligar a la sociedad respecto de los actos necesarios para su constitución y 
los relativos al objeto social cuya ejecución durante el período fundacional haya 
sido expresamente autorizada en el acto constitutivo.”). 
 95 Id. art. 183 (“Los directores, los fundadores y la sociedad en formación 
son solidaria e ilimitadamente responsables por estos actos mientras la sociedad 
no esté inscripta.”). 
 96 Id. art. 183 (“Por los demás actos cumplidos antes de la inscripción serán 
responsables ilimitada y solidariamente las personas que los hubieran realizado 
y los directores y fundadores que los hubieren consentido.”). 
 97 Id. art. 184 (“Inscripto el contrato constitutivo, los actos necesarios para 
la constitución y los realizados en virtud de expresa facultad conferida en el acto 
constitutivo, se tendrán como originariamente cumplidos por la sociedad. Los 
promotores, fundadores y directores quedan liberados frente a terceros de las 
obligaciones emergentes de estos actos.”). 
 98 Id. art. 184 (“El directorio podrá resolver, dentro de los tres (3) meses de 
realizada la inscripción, la asunción por la sociedad [de] las obligaciones resul-
tantes de los demás actos cumplidos antes de la inscripción, dando cuenta a la 
asamblea ordinaria.”). 
 99 Id. art. 184 (“La asunción de estas obligaciones por la sociedad, no libera 
de responsabilidad a quienes las contrajeron, ni a los directores y fundadores que 
los consintieron.”). 
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to a promotion by subscription.100 Thereafter, the company may 
“assume any obligation legitimately undertaken” by them and “re-
imburse them” for any essential expenditure.101 It may repay them 
for the rest upon obtaining authorization when the investors first 
meet.102 
Likewise, “whoever acts on behalf of [a stock issuing German 
business] before” it registers renders herself personally accounta-
ble.103 Nonetheless, it may accept any ensuing charges and step in 
her shoes up to ninety days after its registration.104 All the same, 
the bylaws must integrate, for adoption, any “contract on special 
advantages, formation outlay, contribution in kind, or asset acqui-
sition.”105 
In Delaware, the “the . . . incorporators . . . manage the affairs 
of the corporation and may do whatever is necessary and proper to 
perfect the organization [until] the election of” the board.106 In 
light of this language, they could plausibly recover their expenses 
even without corporate consent. Presumably, the incorporated enti-
ty may voluntarily agree to pay them back for reasonably related 
though unnecessary payments. On the other hand, it could face 
legitimate resistance on disbursements enjoying no such reasona-
                                                                                                             
 100 Id. 182 (“En la constitución sucesiva, los promotores responden ilimitada 
y solidariamente por las obligaciones contraídas para la constitución de la socie-
dad . . . .”). 
 101 Id. (“Una vez inscripta, la sociedad asumirá las obligaciones contraídas 
legítimamente por los promotores y les reembolsará los gastos realizados, si su 
gestión ha sido aprobada por la asamblea constitutiva o si los gastos han sido 
necesarios para la constitución.”). 
 102 Id. 
 103 AktG § 41(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Wer vor der Eintragung der Gesellschaft in 
ihrem Namen handelt, haftet persönlich; handeln mehrere, so haften sie als 
Gesamtschuldner.”). 
 104 Id. § 41(2) (“Übernimmt die Gesellschaft eine vor ihrer Eintragung in 
ihrem Namen eingegangene Verpflichtung durch Vertrag mit dem Schuldner in 
der Weise, daß sie an die Stelle des bisherigen Schuldners tritt, so bedarf es zur 
Wirksamkeit der Schuldübernahme der Zustimmung des Gläubigers nicht, wenn 
die Schuldübernahme binnen drei Monaten nach der Eintragung der Gesellschaft 
vereinbart und dem Gläubiger von der Gesellschaft oder dem Schuldner 
mitgeteilt wird.”). 
 105 Id. § 41(3) (“Verpflichtungen aus nicht in der Satzung festgesetzten 
Verträgen über Sondervorteile, Gründungsaufwand, Sacheinlagen oder 
Sachübernahmen kann die Gesellschaft nicht übernehmen.”). 
 106 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 107. 
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ble relationship and therefore coming across as ultra vires, or 
against its powers. 
If unable to persuade her fellows with arguments, a stockholder 
resisting along these lines could sue and “enjoin” the enterprise.107 
She could so proceed despite an authorizing agreement.108 The 
concern itself could lodge a complaint against the responsible of-
ficers or board members “for loss or damage.”109 Ultimately, the 
“Attorney General” could request a forced dissolution or an injunc-
tion against any transacted yet “unauthorized business.”110 
The details differ between and within the traditions on how to 
reimburse costs connected to the promotion. U.S. jurisdictions 
seem to stand alone in allowing the concern implicitly to adopt 
promotional commitments.111 Iowa’s top tribunal has insisted that 
“[t]he adoption or ratification . . . need not be shown by express 
acts, but it may be established by implication.”112 Coincidentally, 
conceptualizing the juridical person as a ratifier under agency theo-
ry entails complications in this context. Since the company, the 
putative principal, “was not in existence at the time of the promot-
er’s [(or agent’s)] contract . . . , it could not [have] then author-
ize[d]” the contractual pledge.113 One should perhaps portray it 
instead as an adopter. 
Apparently universally, an incorporator who has not adequately 
accomplished the process of incorporation may normally not use 
                                                                                                             
 107 See, e.g., id. § 124(1) (“[L]ack of capacity or power may be asserted [i]n 
a proceeding by a stockholder against the corporation to enjoin the doing of any 
act . . . by or to the corporation.”). 
 108 See, e.g., id. § 124(1) (“If the unauthorized acts . . . sought to be enjoined 
are being, or are to be, performed or made pursuant to any contract to which the 
corporation is a party, the court may [equitably] set aside and enjoin the perfor-
mance of such contract . . . .”). 
 109 See, e.g., id. § 124(2) (“[L]ack of capacity or power may be asserted [i]n 
a proceeding by the corporation, . . . against an incumbent or former officer or 
director of the corporation, for loss or damage . . . .”). 
 110 See, e.g., id. § 124(3) (“[L]ack of capacity or power may be asserted [i]n 
a proceeding by the Attorney General to dissolve the corporation, or to enjoin 
the corporation from the transaction of unauthorized business.”). 
 111 See, e.g., Kridelbaugh v. Aldrehn Theatres Co., 191 N.W. 803, 804 (Iowa 
1923) (“[T]he ratification or adoption of a contract by a corporation through its 
board of directors may be implied.”). 
 112 Id. 
 113 CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 283. 
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the corporate form on pain of full accountability. In the United 
States (maybe uniquely), she might get off the hook by vesting her 
venture with “de jure” or “de facto” status through, respectively, 
“substantial” or attempted, good-faith “compliance.”114 In the for-
mer scenario, “courts will recognize [the organization] for all pur-
poses.”115 In the latter, they will do as much “except [against] the 
state,” which may have the enterprise terminated in a “quo warran-
to proceeding.”116 
Nevertheless, U.S. state legislators have bent over backward to 
abolish this doctrinal legacy.117 In the next breath, they have occa-
sionally reclaimed the notion “of corporation by estoppel.”118 Ac-
cordingly, the legitimacy of an entity “claiming a charter under 
color of law . . . cannot be collaterally attacked by persons who 
have dealt with it as” such.119 
Such looseness might reflect the flexibility or user-friendliness 
supposedly characteristic of the common law. More likely, it might 
show the ability and willingness of U.S. judges to adjudicate equi-
tably, whether against the mandate or with the encouragement of 
lawmakers. In contrast, Latin America and Europe appear to rely 
religiously on the statutory particulars and to keep the bench on a 
short leash. 
                                                                                                             
 114 Id. at 238-39. 
 115 Id. at 238. 
 116 Id. at 239. 
 117 Sherwood & Roberts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander 525 P.2d 135, 138 (Or. 
1974) (“[T]he statute [in force] was intended to abolish the common-law doc-
trine of de facto corporations.”); Don Swann Sales Corp. v. Echols, 287 S.E.2d 
577, 578 (Ga. 1981) (“The Business Corporation Code of Georgia has eliminat-
ed the doctrine of de facto corporations as applied to defectively organized cor-
porations . . . .”); Thompson & Green Machinery Co. v. Music City Lumber Co., 
683 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. 1984) (“[T]he Tennessee General Assembly, by 
passage of the Tennessee General Corporations Act of 1968, abolished the con-
cept of de facto incorporation . . . .”). 
 118 Don Swann, 287 S.E.2d at 578 (“However, Code Ann. § 22-5103 has 
retained the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.”). But cf. Thompson & Green 
Machinery, 683 S.W.2d at 345 (“We are of the opinion that the doctrine of cor-
poration by estoppel met its demise by the enactment of the Tennessee General 
Corporations Act of 1968.”). 
 119 Don Swann, 287 S.E.2d at 578 (quoting Business Corporation Code of 
Georgia Ann. § 22-5103). 
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PIERCING 
An Argentine adjudicator must sometimes refuse to restrict re-
sponsibility even though the incorporators have fully fulfilled the 
foundation formalities.120 She must then (in U.S. jargon) “pierce 
the corporate veil.”121 Accordingly, investors become entirely lia-
ble for their firm’s debts. 
The relevant statute renders “shareholders and controllers” 
jointly and unlimitedly responsible for running their venture incon-
sistently with the stated business “purposes,” “the law,” “the public 
order” or “good faith,” “or” to the detriment of “third parties.”122 
Perhaps it should have hooked up the finishing phrase with the 
conjunction ‘and’ instead. After all, the damage to others should 
amount to not a separate justification to disregard the corporative 
form but an essential element to stake a claim. Otherwise, the 
bench could confront countless complaints. In the Connecticut top 
tribunal’s phrasing of the “instrumentality rule” in this area, the 
plaintiff must prove “[c]ontrol,” a “wrong or fraud,” “and” an “un-
just loss.”123 
The German code, for its part, does not contemplate these 
causes. It leaves them and their treatment to the judicial branch. 
The latter has enunciated, expectedly in the context of relatively 
cozy limited-liability companies, that “the prospect of personal 
accountability surfaces whenever the demarcation between organi-
zational and private wealth blurs through nontransparent 
bookkeeping or other means.”124 It has elaborated that in the midst 
                                                                                                             
 120 See generally L. 19550 art. 54 (Arg.) (1984). 
 121 See, e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 352 (1996) (“The District 
Court ultimately agreed to pierce the corporate veil and entered judgment 
. . . .”). 
 122 L. 19550 art. 54 (Arg.) (1984) (“La actuación de la sociedad que encubra 
la consecución de fines extrasocietarios, constituya un mero recurso para violar 
la ley, el orden público o la buena fe o para frustrar derechos de terceros, se 
imputará directamente a los socios o a los controlantes que la hicieron posible, 
quienes responderán solidaria e ilimitadamente por los perjuicios causados.”). 
 123 Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967) 
 124 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Highest Federal Ordinary Court], Nov. 14, 
2005, II ZR 178/03, ¶ 14 (“Nach der Rechtsprechung des Senates kommt eine 
persönliche Haftung . . .in Betracht, wenn die Abgrenzung zwischen 
Gesellschafts- und Privatvermögen durch eine undurchsichtige Buchführung 
oder auf andere Weise verschleiert worden ist . . . .”). 
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of such blur, “the capital-protection prescriptions, whose ob-
servance constitutes an indispensable quid pro quo for the limita-
tion of liability to the organization’s assets, cannot function.”125 
Consequently, the judiciary in Germany has sided with aspirant 
piercers “on account of misuse of the [concern’s] juridical 
form.”126 It has focused primordially on “cases of commingling of 
income.”127 The precedents do not seem to extrapolate to a con-
demnation of any stockholder who fraudulently or illegally misus-
es the institution. 
Already in 1906, the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin did not itself shy away from a generalized formulation, 
famous throughout the United States: 
If any general rule can be laid down, in the present 
state of authority, it is that a corporation will be 
looked upon as a legal entity . . . until sufficient rea-
son to the contrary appears; but, when the [corpora-
tive structure] is used to defeat public convenience, 
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the 
law will regard the corporation as an association of 
persons.128 
Hence, the passage opens with a presumption against piercing 
and ends up formulating the rebuttal in terms that recall those of 
Argentina’s legislation. On the flip side of the coin and as pro-
nounced by New York’s forum of last resort, investors “clearly 
                                                                                                             
 125 Id. (“[D]eshalb [können] die Kapitalerhaltungsvorschriften, deren 
Einhaltung ein unverzichtbarer Ausgleich für die Haftungsbeschränkung auf das 
Gesellschaftsvermögen . . .ist, nicht funktionieren . . . .”). 
 126 BGH, July 16, 2007, Trihotel, II ZR 3/04, ¶ 27 (“Durchgriffshaftung 
wegen Missbrauchs der Rechtsform der GmbH”) (citing BGH, July 24, 2002, II 
ZR 300/00). 
 127 Id. (“Rechtsfolge wäre nämlich . . . eine grundsätzlich unbeschränkte 
Durchgriffs-Außenhaftung gegenüber den Gläubigern . . . wie sie der Senat im 
Übrigen weiterhin für die Fälle der Vermögensvermischung bejaht . . . .”). 
 128 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Trans. Co., 142 F. 247, 255 
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905). See also Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 
(2003) (“The veil separating corporations and their shareholders may be pierced 
in some circumstances . . . .The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, however, 
is the rare exception, applied in the case of fraud or certain other exceptional 
circumstances.”) 
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[stay] within the limits of . . . public policy” in the absence of 
“fraud, misrepresentation [or] illegality.”129 
Consistently, Delawarean triers will yield to a would-be piercer 
“in the interest of justice, [vis-à-vis] such matters as fraud, contra-
vention of law or contract, public wrong, or [favorable] equitable 
consideration[s]”130 Nonetheless, they will presumptively block 
her attempt. Indeed, “persuading” them on this front generally 
boils down to “a difficult task.”131 It demands bearing a bit of a 
burden.132 
The Argentine and German enactments do not explicitly pre-
sume limited liability in this domain. Still, they do so implicitly 
through their respective inaugural assertions: One, “[T]he share-
holders limit their responsibility upon paying for the subscribed 
shares.”133 Two, “Creditors may only hold organizational assets 
accountable for the organization’s commitments.”134 
Pertinently, the ordinarily highest organ of adjudication in 
Germany has worried about overextending a “fundamentally unre-
stricted external accountability.”135 It has warned that doing so 
“would risk missing the mark and, against the legislative intent, 
pulling the rug out from under the [juridical] formation.”136 There-
fore, the quoted decision (Trihotel) addresses an “impairment of 
the enterprise’s income”—namely, a misappropriation—as a fault-
based tort in order to “attenuate the consequences” and “avoid 
                                                                                                             
 129 Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 127 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1955). 
 130 Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 
1968). 
 131 Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Green Farms. Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 114, No. 
Civ. A. 1131, at 10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1989). 
 132 Id. 
 133 L. 19550 art. 163 (Arg.) (1984) (“Los socios limitan su responsabilidad a 
la integración de las acciones suscriptas.”). 
 134 AktG § 1(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Für die Verbindlichkeiten der Gesellschaft 
haftet den Gläubigern nur das Gesellschaftsvermögen.”). 
 135 BGH, July 16, 2007, Trihotel, II ZR 3/04, ¶ 21 (“Versagen die[] 
Grundregeln des Kapitalschutzes . . . , so kommt erst dann eine 
durchgriffsrechtlich strukturierte, grundsätzlich unbeschränkte Außenhaftung 
wegen Verlustes des Haftungsprivilegs . . . zum Zuge.”). 
 136 Id. ¶ 27 (“[E]ine derartige uneingeschränkte Erfolgshaftung . . . liefe 
[Gefahr], in einer Vielzahl von Fällen weit über das Ziel hinauszuschießen und 
der Gesellschaftsform der GmbH - entgegen den Zielen des Gesetzgebers - den 
Boden zu entziehen.”). 
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overreactions.”137 It posits the possibility of evidencing that “a 
proper deportment” by the defendant would have produced “a 
slighter harm” and charging her merely with the restitution of the 
difference.138 
The approach in Argentina itself diverge from its U.S. counter-
part in further respects. Concretely, it treats inconsistency with the 
declared institutional objective as a ground for ignoring the organi-
zational form. Surely, this divergence derives to a significant ex-
tent from the fact that such declaration plays a prominent role on 
Argentine soil, as opposed to the United States. On the former, 
founders must define a “precise and definite” corporative goal.139 
In the latter, they must no longer definitively deliver a definition of 
the sort.140 Articulating the aim “to engage in any lawful act or 
activity for which corporations may be organized” suffices.141 Del-
aware started accepting such an ample articulation in 1967.142 
Thus, it set a trend that has spread across the nation.143 
On this ultimate point, the German system resembles that of 
Argentina. It commands “the bylaws [to] determine . . . the enter-
                                                                                                             
 137 Id. ¶ 21 (“[D]ie eingriffsbedingte Schädigung des 
Gesellschaftsvermögens . . . kann aber schließlich in eine 
verschuldensabhängige Schadensersatzhaftung [zur Abmilderung . . . und zur 
Vermeidung von Überreaktionen] einmünden . . . .”). 
 138 Id. (“[D]em Gesellschafter [wird] die Möglichkeit eröffnet . . . , den 
Nachweis zu führen, dass bei ordnungsgemäßem Vorgehen ein geringerer 
Schaden entstanden wäre, der dann nur in diesem Umfang auszugleichen ist.”). 
 139 L. 19550 art. 11(3) (Arg.) (1984) (“La designación de su objeto, que debe 
ser preciso y determinado . . . .”). 
 140 See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 555 (1933) (“Permission to incor-
porate for ‘any lawful purpose’ was not common until 1875.”). The Model 
Business Corporation Act requires a purpose clause only when the corporation 
decides to impose limits. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (2016) (“Every 
corporation incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any law-
ful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorpo-
ration.”). 
 141 Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 102(3). 
 142 CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 65. 
 143 Id. See also id. at 239 n.35 (“A large majority of states permit such an 
‘all-purpose’ clause, but about one-sixth still require a reasonably definite 
statement of purposes although probably allowing it to be followed by a general 
‘all-purpose’ provision.”). 
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prise’s object.”144 “For industrial and commercial” companies, its 
command continues, “the types of manufactured and traded prod-
ucts and goods should be more closely specified.”145 
However, Germany’s scheme appears not to envisage a termi-
nation of investors’ immunity as a penalty for operating outside the 
determination or specification. It barely bids “any stockholder or 
member of the directorate or supervisory council to sue to invali-
date” organizations that proclaim no end at all or do so invalidly.146 
Presumably, the suitor may parallelly proceed against managers 
and councilors for lack of prudence and conscientiousness in di-
recting, instigating, or condoning the invalidities. 
In conclusion, Argentine lawmakers have characteristically 
codified the action to dismantle a corporate façade. Their German 
colleagues seem to have shunned such codification. As a result, 
they have inadvertently or intentionally invited the judge to do the 
honors. In the face of the main divide between civil and common 
law, Argentina and the U.S. jurisdictions have aligned as expected. 
Germany has not. 
GOVERNANCE 
The Argentine regime exhibits its civil-law face most conspic-
uously in the hierarchical structure it prescribes for companies. It 
contemplates, generally along German lines, not a unitary but in-
stead a two-tier corporate governance. Publicly incorporated enti-
ties must institute a directorate and either a supervisory council or 
a panel of trustees. They must avoid any overlap in membership 
between the directorial and the control contingent. To boot, the 
                                                                                                             
 144 AktG § 23(3) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Satzung muß bestimmen . . . 2. den 
Gegenstand des Unternehmens . . . .”). 
 145 Id. § 23(3) (“[N]amentlich ist bei Industrie- und Handelsunternehmen die 
Art der Erzeugnisse und Waren, die hergestellt und gehandelt werden sollen, 
näher anzugeben . . . .”). 
 146 Id. § 275(1) (“Enthält die Satzung keine Bestimmungen . . . über den 
Gegenstand des Unternehmens oder sind die Bestimmungen der Satzung über 
den Gegenstand des Unternehmens nichtig, so kann jeder Aktionär und jedes 
Mitglied des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats darauf klagen, daß die 
Gesellschaft für nichtig erklärt werde.”). 
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latter may not sit directors, administrators or employees of the es-
tablishment.147 
Article 255 of the applicable statute enunciates that the board 
will run the venture. It reads, “A directorate of one or more mem-
bers [inducted] by the shareholders or by the [councilors] shall 
manage” the concern.148 Besides, the directorial chairperson speaks 
for the enterprise with exclusivity, except when the bylaws author-
ize her codirectors too.149 
Almost identically, Germany’s statutory framers have obliged 
the directorate, composed “of one or various persons,”150 to “ad-
minister [its] organization under its own responsibility.”151 Some-
what differently, however, they have charged it, as a unit, with rep-
resenting the firm “in and out of court.”152 In particular, its mem-
bers, when they surpass two in number, must assume the represen-
tation collectively, “unless the bylaws declare otherwise.”153 
Delaware equally entrusts the directorial board, which “shall 
consist of 1 or more members,”154 with the direction of the “busi-
ness and affairs of [the] corporation.”155 It seems not to posit a de-
fault rule on the representative role. Presumably the charter must 
settle the matter. Other U.S. jurisdictions have held that the occu-
                                                                                                             
 147 L. 19550 arts. 286, 280 (Arg.) (1984) (“No pueden ser síndicos: . . . (2) 
Los directores, gerentes y empleados de la misma sociedad o de otra controlada 
o controlante . . . .”) (“El estatuto podrá organizar un consejo de vigilancia 
. . . .Se aplicará[] [el] artículo[] 286 . . . .”). 
 148 Id. art. 255 (“La administración está a cargo de un directorio compuesto 
de uno o más directores designados por la asamblea de accionistas o el consejo 
de vigilancia, en su caso.”). 
 149 Id. art. 268 (“La representación de la sociedad corresponde al presidente 
del directorio.”). 
 150 AktG § 76(2) (Ger.) (1965) (“Der Vorstand kann aus einer oder mehreren 
Personen bestehen.”). 
 151 Id. § 76(1) (“Der Vorstand hat unter eigener Verantwortung die 
Gesellschaft zu leiten.”). 
 152 Id. § 78(1) (“Der Vorstand vertritt die Gesellschaft gerichtlich und 
außergerichtlich.”). 
 153 Id. § 78(2) (“Besteht der Vorstand aus mehreren Personen, so sind, wenn 
die Satzung nichts anderes bestimmt, sämtliche Vorstandsmitglieder nur 
gemeinschaftlich zur Vertretung der Gesellschaft befugt.”). 
 154 Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 141(b). 
 155 Id. § 141(a). 
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pier of the directorial presidency may “act in behalf of” the under-
taking only with “authorization” from her fellows.156 
The constituency of holders of stock in Argentina may instate 
“between three and fifteen members” into a supervisory council.157 
It may reelect them, or remove them at will.158 A candidate for of-
fice must herself own shares in the enterprise.159 She thus differs 
evidently from her German counterparts as well as definitely from 
Delawarean directors, who “need not be stockholders.”160 
Argentine councilors mainly “supervise the directorate’s per-
formance” and may appoint its membership.161 They “may exam-
ine the organizational accounting, goods, and bookkeeping wheth-
er directly or through” external expertise.162 Beyond reporting at 
least “every trimester,”163 the oversight organ must arrange for an 
“annual audit” and “submit” the results to the investors.164 It may 
“convene” the latter and form a committee to explore “any issue” 
raised by them or by itself.165 
Germany’s version of this institution might have influenced its 
equivalent in Argentina given its similarities: It must feature a trio 
                                                                                                             
 156 Lloydona Peters Enters. v. Dorius, 658 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 1983). 
 157 See L. 19550 art. 280 (Arg.) (1984) (“El estatuto podrá organizar un con-
sejo de vigilancia, integrado por tres a quince accionistas designados por la 
asamblea . . . .”). 
 158 Id. (“El . . . consejo de vigilancia [estará] integrado por . . . accionistas 
designados por la asamblea . . . , reelegibles y libremente revocables.”). 
 159 Id. (“El . . . consejo de vigilancia [estará] integrado por accionistas 
. . . .”). 
 160 Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 141(b). 
 161 L. 19550 arts. 281(a), 281(d) (Arg.) (1984) (“Son funciones del consejo 
de vigilancia: (a) Fiscalizar la gestión del directorio . . . .(d) La elección de los 
integrantes del directorio, cuando lo establezca el estatuto, sin perjuicio de su 
revocabilidad por la asamblea.”). 
 162 Id. art. 281(a) (“Puede examinar la contabilidad social, los bienes socia-
les, realizar arqueos de caja, sea directamente o por peritos que designe . . . .”). 
 163 Id. art. 281(a) (“Por lo menos trimestralmente, el directorio presentará al 
consejo informe escrito acerca de la gestión social . . . .”). 
 164 Id. art. 283 (“[Habrá] auditoría anual, contratada por el consejo de vigi-
lancia, y su informe sobre estados contables se someterá a la asamblea . . . .”). 
 165 Id. art. 281(b), 281(f) (“(b) Convocará la asamblea cuando estime conve-
niente o lo requieran accionistas.”) (“(f) Designar una o más comisiones para 
investigar o examinar cuestiones o denuncias de accionistas o para vigilar la 
ejecución de sus decisiones.”). 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 31 
 
of members as a minimum.166 Its duties boil down to the supervi-
sion of “management.”167 They extend to hiring an “auditor” annu-
ally and convening “a shareholder meeting” whenever “the organi-
zation’s well-being so demands.”168 
Likewise, the council may “review and proof the [corpora-
tion’s] books, writings, and assets” as well as recruit individuals 
within it ranks “or special experts for specific tasks.”169 It may “at 
any time” requisition from the directors “a report on” the entity’s 
doings.170 Its “members” may not belong to the directorate.171 Nor 
may they, as a group, undertake “managerial activities.”172 
Nonetheless, the German model differentiates itself fundamen-
tally by necessitating corporate councilors. It compels the ap-
pointment of half or a third of them by the workforce when the 
latter comprises, respectively, (1) at least two thousand or (2) be-
                                                                                                             
 166 AktG § 95 (Ger.) (1965) (“Der Aufsichtsrat besteht aus drei Mitgliedern. 
Die Satzung kann eine bestimmte höhere Zahl festsetzen.”). 
 167 Id. § 111(1) (“Der Aufsichtsrat hat die Geschäftsführung zu überwa-
chen.”). 
 168 Id. § 111(2) (“Er erteilt dem Abschlußprüfer den Prüfungsauftrag . . . .”); 
id. § 111(3) (“Der Aufsichtsrat hat eine Hauptversammlung einzuberufen, wenn 
das Wohl der Gesellschaft es fordert.”). 
 169 Id. § 111(2) (“Der Aufsichtsrat kann die Bücher und Schriften der 
Gesellschaft sowie die Vermögensgegenstände . . . einsehen und prüfen.”); id. 
(“Er kann damit auch einzelne Mitglieder oder für bestimmte Aufgaben 
besondere Sachverständige beauftragen.”). 
 170 Id. § 90 (3) (“Der Aufsichtsrat kann vom Vorstand jederzeit einen Bericht 
verlangen über Angelegenheiten der Gesellschaft . . . .”). 
 171 Id. § 105(1) (“Ein Aufsichtsratsmitglied kann nicht zugleich 
Vorstandsmitglied . . . sein.”). 
 172 Id. § 111(4) (“Maßnahmen der Geschäftsführung können dem 
Aufsichtsrat nicht übertragen werden.”). 
32 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1 
 
tween five hundred and two thousand employees.173 The selection 
of the rest of the membership falls upon investors.174 
In fact, France’s council resembles its Argentine namesake 
precisely in its non-obligatory character.175 As in the couple of 
conciliar systems surveyed so far, it “permanently” controls “the 
management of the organization” by the directorial board and may 
not overlap with the latter in its “members.”176 As in Germany ra-
ther than Argentina, French councilors must name the directors.177 
Still, they may count solely “up to four” labor delegates, if any, 
among themselves and no more than “a third” of the total.178 
                                                                                                             
 173 Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] [Codetermination Law] § 1(1) (Ger.) 
(1976) (“In Unternehmen, die . . . in der Rechtsform einer Aktiengesellschaft . . . 
und . . . in der Regel mehr als 2.000 Arbeitnehmer beschäftigen, haben die 
Arbeitnehmer ein Mitbestimmungsrecht nach Maßgabe dieses Gesetzes.”); 
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz [DrittelbG] [One-Third Participation Law] § 1(1) 
(Ger.) (1976) (“Die Arbeitnehmer haben ein Mitbestimmungsrecht im 
Aufsichtsrat nach Maßgabe dieses Gesetzes in . . . einer Aktiengesellschaft mit 
in der Regel mehr als 500 Arbeitnehmern . . . .”); id. § 4(1) (“Der Aufsichtsrat 
eines in § 1 Abs. 1 bezeichneten Unternehmens muss zu einem Drittel aus 
Arbeitnehmervertretern bestehen.”). 
 174 See AktG § 96(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Der Aufsichtsrat setzt sich zusammen 
bei Gesellschaften, für die das Mitbestimmungsgesetz gilt, aus 
Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern der Aktionäre und der Arbeitnehmer . . . .”) (“Der 
Aufsichtsrat setzt sich zusammen . . . bei Gesellschaften, für die das 
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz gilt, aus Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern der Aktionäre und 
der Arbeitnehmer . . . .”). 
 175 See CD. COM. Legislative Part, bk. II, tit. II, ch. V, § 2, Subsection 2 art. 
L225-57 (Fr.) (“Du directoire et du conseil de surveillance”), (“Il peut être stipu-
lé par les statuts de toute société anonyme que celle-ci est régie par les disposi-
tions de la présente sous-section.”). 
 176 Id. art. L225-68, Subsection 2 (“Le conseil de surveillance exerce le con-
trôle permanent de la gestion de la société par le directoire.”); id. art. L225-74 
(“Aucun membre du conseil de surveillance ne peut faire partie du directoire.”). 
 177 Id. art. L225-59 (“Les membres du directoire sont nommés par le conseil 
de surveillance . . . .”); AktG § 96(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Vorstandsmitglieder 
bestellt der Aufsichtsrat . . . .”). 
 178 CD. COM. art. L225-79 (Fr.) (“Il peut être stipulé dans les statuts que le 
conseil de surveillance comprend . . . des membres élus . . . par le personnel de 
la société . . . .”) (“Le nombre des membres du conseil de surveillance élus par 
les salariés ne peut être supérieur à quatre ni excéder le tiers du nombre des 
autres membres.”). 
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Argentine investors may dispense with such supervision in fa-
vor of “private monitoring,”179 in one of a trinity of forms. Rough-
ly, if nonpublic and small (worth under ten million pesos), a corpo-
ration may have its stockholders serve as monitors empowered to 
inspect its “[files] and papers and entreat managers for reports.”180 
If organized non-publicly and at a large scale (with over ten mil-
lion pesos in capital), it may engage “one or more trustees” and an 
“equal number” of substitutes to monitor.181 
Thirdly, public companies may assign the trusteeing to a colle-
gial panel of an unevenly numbered membership.182 They may 
have their “administration” watchdogged in this manner.183 
Whether institutional as in this case or individual as in the previous 
one, the watchdog must peruse “the organizational records and 
documentation . . . at least every three months”184 and prepare “a 
written and well-founded account of the economic and financial 
situation of the organization for each ordinary shareholder-
assembly.”185 
This “overseeing commission”186 must “deliver” relevant “in-
formation” requested—as well as “investigate grievances formu-
lated in writing”—by anyone possessing no less than two per cen-
                                                                                                             
 179 L. 19550 ch. II, § V(8) (“DE LA FISCALIZACIÓN PRIVADA”) (Arg.) 
(1984). 
 180 Id. arts. 55, 284 (“Los socios pueden examinar los libros y papeles socia-
les y recabar del administrador los informes que estimen pertinentes.”) (“Las 
sociedades que no estén comprendidas en ninguno de los supuestos a que se 
refiere el artículo 299 . . . podrán prescindir de la sindicatura cuando así esté 
previsto en el estatuto. En tal caso los socios poseen el derecho de contralor que 
confiere el artículo 55.”). 
 181 Id. art. 284 (“Está a cargo de uno o más síndicos designados por la asam-
blea de accionistas. Se elegirá igual número de síndicos suplentes.”). 
 182 Id. art. 284 (“Cuando la sociedad estuviere comprendida en el artículo 
299 —excepto su inciso (2.)— la sindicatura debe ser colegiada en número im-
par.”). 
 183 Id. art. 294(1) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (1) Fiscalizar 
la administración de la sociedad . . . .”). 
 184 Id. art. 294(1) (“[E]l síndico . . . : (1) . . . examinará los libros y documen-
tación . . . , por lo menos, una vez cada tres (3) meses.”). 
 185 Id. art. 294(5) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (5) . . . Pre-
sentar a la asamblea ordinaria un informe escrito y fundado sobre la situación 
económica y financiera de la sociedad . . . .”). 
 186 Id. art. 290 (“Cuando la sindicatura fuere plural, actuará como cuerpo 
colegiado, y se denominará ‘Comisión Fiscalizadora.’”). 
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tum of the stock.187 It must ensure the concern’s “compliance with 
laws, bylaws, regulations, and investor resolutions.”188 The com-
missioners must “attend, with voice but no vote, meetings of the 
directorate, executive committee, and stockholders.”189 They may 
“convoke” the latter to meet extraordinarily, ordinarily, or special-
ly.190 
Shareholders may oust the appointees without cause, except 
when “five percent” of the ownership objects.191 They enjoy barely 
one ballot per share for the designation or dismissal of trustees.192 
The voters may also determine “the remuneration” and any par-
ticular “responsibilities” of the members of not merely the trustee 
panel but additionally the board and “the supervisory council.”193 
Seemingly, councilors conduct themselves less intrusively than 
trustees. On first impression, they appear not to show up at the 
main corporate gatherings or to report on or scrutinize the corpora-
tion as frequently. Appearances notwithstanding, their collective 
                                                                                                             
 187 Id. arts. 294(6), 294(11) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (6) 
Suministrar a accionistas que representen no menos del Dos por Ciento (2 %) 
del capital, en cualquier momento que éstos se lo requieran, información sobre 
las materias que son de su competencia; . . . (11) Investigar las denuncias que le 
formulen por escrito accionistas que representen no menos del Dos por Ciento (2 
%) del capital . . . .”). 
 188 Id. art. 294(9) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (9) Vigilar 
que los órganos sociales den debido cumplimiento a la ley, estatuto, reglamento 
y decisiones asamblearias . . . .”). 
 189 Id. art. 294(3) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (3) Asistir 
con voz, pero sin voto, a las reuniones del directorio, del comité ejecutivo y de 
la asamblea . . . .”). See also id. art. 240 (“Los . . . síndicos . . . tienen derecho y 
obligación de asistir con voz a todas las asambleas. Sólo tendrán voto en la me-
dida que les corresponda como accionistas . . . .”). 
 190 Id. art. 294(7) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (7) Convocar 
a asamblea extraordinaria, cuando lo juzgue necesario y a asamblea ordinaria o 
asambleas especiales, cuando omitiere hacerlo el directorio . . . .”) 
 191 Id. art. 287 (“Su designación es revocable solamente por la asamblea de 
accionistas, que podrá disponerla sin causa siempre que no medie oposición del 
cinco por ciento (5 %) del capital social.”). 
 192 Id. art. 284 (“Cada acción dará en todos los casos derechos a un sólo voto 
para la elección y remoción de los síndicos . . . .”). 
 193 Id. arts. 234(2), 234(3) (“Corresponde a la asamblea ordinaria considerar 
y resolver los siguientes asuntos: . . . (2) Designación y remoción de directores y 
síndicos y miembros del consejo de vigilancia y fijación de su retribución; (3) 
Responsabilidad de los directores y síndicos y miembros del consejo de vigilan-
cia . . . .”). 
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should not distinguish itself on this whole front from that of over-
seers. After all, it must exercise, “the functions and faculties [statu-
torily] attributed” to the latter, in addition to its own.194 
Argentina apparently shifts to a common-law mode on all these 
questions. It invites an incorporator to a range of alternatives. She 
may choose according to her preferences or particularities. For in-
stance, her choice for the supervisory council might itself derive 
from her desire to allow for (1) the removal of corporate control-
lers against the objections of a five percent faction or (2) the con-
ciliar determination of directorial board.195 Needless to say, it 
would have to abide by the countless conditions imposed, in an 
apparent shift back to a civil-law approach, on its execution. 
In any event, investors designate and discharge their “directors, 
trustees, and councilors” during their regular meetings.196 They 
must do so “by absolute majority of the ballots present.”197 Upon 
their request, the entity must adopt cumulative voting for up to a 
third of the directorate, supervisory-council, or trustee-panel.198 It 
may thereby grant minority stockholders a voice on any such body 
through a concentration of “their votes on a limited number of 
nominees.”199 
                                                                                                             
 194 Id. art. 281(g) (“Son funciones del consejo de vigilancia: . . . (g) Las de-
más funciones y facultades atribuidas en esta ley a los síndicos.”). 
 195 Id. art. 281(d) (“Son funciones del consejo de vigilancia: . . . (d) La elec-
ción de los integrantes del directorio, cuando lo establezca el estatuto, sin perjui-
cio de su revocabilidad por la asamblea.”). 
 196 Id. arts. 234(2) (“Corresponde a la asamblea ordinaria considerar y resol-
ver los siguientes asuntos: . . . (2) Designación y remoción de directores y síndi-
cos y miembros del consejo de vigilancia y fijación de su retribución . . . .”). 
 197 Id. arts. 243 (“Las resoluciones [de la asamblea ordinaria] serán tomadas 
por mayoría absoluta de los votos presentes que puedan emitirse en la respectiva 
decisión, salvo cuando el estatuto exija mayor número.”). 
 198 Id. art. 263 (“Los accionistas tienen derecho a elegir hasta Un Tercio 
(1/3) de las vacantes a llenar en el directorio por el sistema de voto acumulati-
vo.”); id. art. 280 (“El estatuto podrá organizar un consejo de vigilancia, inte-
grado por tres a quince accionistas designados por la asamblea conforme a los 
artículos 262 o 263, reelegibles y libremente revocables.”); id. art. 289 (“Los 
accionistas pueden ejercer el derecho reconocido por el artículo 263, en las con-
diciones fijadas por éste, [en la elección de los síndicos].”). 
 199 See CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 587 (“Cumulative vot-
ing is a system of voting for the election of directors that is intended to give 
minority shareholders representation on the board by allowing them to concen-
trate their votes on a limited number of nominees.”). 
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Vis-à-vis a hypothetical twelve-member board, shareholders 
could cumulatively install a maximum of four members. They 
would receive a quartet of ballots per share if they all partook in 
the cumulation.200 In this scenario, a voter holding three of twelve 
shares could guarantee the installation of one of her candidates by 
concentrating minimally ten of her sixteen votes behind him. In a 
straight contest, she would not get a single representative if no one 
else backed her. A majority owner could handpick the totality of 
the directors.201 
The German enactment does not envision shareholders cumu-
lating their suffrages. In contrast, Delaware does offer the option: 
The certificate of incorporation of any corporation 
may provide that at [directorial] elections, each 
holder of stock . . . shall be entitled to as many 
votes as . . . [his] shares . . . multiplied by the num-
ber of directors to be elected . . . . [He] may cast all 
[his ballots] for a single [candidacy] or may distrib-
ute them among [the various at stake].202 
The Argentine scheme deviates from the Delawarean largely 
inconsequentially, as in permitting some investors to participate 
while others do not.203 Nevertheless, it diverges importantly in that 
it announces the following about cumulative balloting: “The by-
laws cannot repeal this right, nor regulate it in a way that hinders 
its exercise . . . .”204 
U.S. statutes mostly make such cumulation “optional.”205 A 
few of them mandate it, “unless the certificate . . . expressly can-
                                                                                                             
 200 L. 19550 art. 263(4) (Arg.) (1984) (“Cada accionista que vote acumulati-
vamente tendrá un número de votos igual al que resulte de multiplicar los que 
normalmente le hubieren correspondido por el número de directores a elegir.”). 
 201 See generally id. art. 263. 
 202 Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 214. 
 203 See L. 19550 art. 263(5) (Arg.) (1984) (“Los accionistas que voten por el 
sistema ordinario o plural y los que voten acumulativamente competirán en la 
elección del tercio de las vacantes a llenar . . . .”). 
 204 See id. art. 263(4) (“El estatuto no puede derogar este derecho, ni regla-
mentarlo de manera que dificulte su ejercicio . . . .”). 
 205 CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 588. 
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cels it.”206 To prevent its negation, they often “require a minimum 
number of directors in each class.”207 
By and large, Argentina has lined up with Germany and France 
in establishing a dually headed corporate government. Hence, it 
has countenanced, though to a lesser extent than this dyad of Euro-
pean countries, additional checks on the board along with represen-
tation of stakeholders, like creditors or workers. Perhaps under 
U.S. influence, Argentine authorities have opened the door to vot-
ing cumulatively for all leadership positions. Even so, they have 
ostensibly imparted to it a civil-law flavor by rendering it compul-
sory. 
DISCIPLINE 
In Argentina, “administrators” or “representatives” of any 
commercial concern must “act loyally and as diligently as a good 
businessperson. If they neglect their obligations, they [must] bear 
unlimited and joint liability for any [injury] or prejudice that may 
result from their acts or omissions.”208 
Hence, the inducted managerial leadership fiducially obligates 
itself toward its shareholders and corporation. It may not favor it-
self or anyone else over them. On this front, the leaders must meet 
a high benchmark. They must deport themselves as an experienced 
rather than a regular undertaker. 
“[T]he organization, its investors, and [even] third parties” may 
hold the directorate accountable for performing its functions poor-
ly.209 They may sue “for violations of the law, the bylaws, or any 
[corporative] regulation as well as for any other [harm] stemming 
                                                                                                             
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 600. 
 208 L. 19550 art. 59 (Arg.) (1984) (“Los administradores y los representantes 
de la sociedad deben obrar con lealtad y con la diligencia de un buen hombre de 
negocios. Los que faltaren a sus obligaciones son responsables, ilimitada y soli-
dariamente, por los daños y perjuicios que resultaren de su acción u omisión.”). 
 209 Id. art. 274 (“Los directores responden ilimitada y solidariamente hacia la 
sociedad, los accionistas y los terceros, por el mal desempeño de su cargo 
. . . .”). 
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from fraud, abuse of power, or grave fault.”210 Nonetheless, a di-
rector responds on the basis of her individual participation.211 She 
may exempt herself from accountability if she objects to the direc-
torial dereliction beforehand in writing and alerts the trustees,212 or 
presumably the councilors. 
As a token of their loyalty, “directors” must “divulge to the di-
rectorate” and the overseeing commission, or the conciliar organ, 
“any contrary interest, while abstaining from participating in every 
interconnected deliberation.”213 Moreover, they may not compete 
with their company directly or indirectly unless they obtain stock-
holder authorization in advance.214 Finally, a director may contract 
with the corporation if she does so as part of her professional activ-
ity and at the market rate. Otherwise she must procure the blessing 
“of the directorate” or “trustee panel” (or the council) and notify 
the shareholders.215 
The investors may exonerate the directorial board by endorsing 
its engagement, refusing to challenge it in court, or settling with 
                                                                                                             
 210 Id. art. 274 (“Los directores responden . . . por la violación de la ley, el 
estatuto o el reglamento y por cualquier otro daño producido por dolo, abuso de 
facultades o culpa grave.”). 
 211 Id. art. 274 (“[L]a imputación de responsabilidad se hará atendiendo a la 
actuación individual cuando se hubieren asignado funciones en forma personal 
de acuerdo con lo establecido en el estatuto, el reglamento o decisión asamblea-
ria.”). 
 212 Id. art. 274 (“Queda exento de responsabilidad el director que participó 
en la deliberación o resolución o que la conoció, si deja constancia escrita de su 
protesta y diera noticia al síndico antes que su responsabilidad se denuncie al 
directorio, al síndico, a la asamblea, a la autoridad competente, o se ejerza la 
acción judicial.”). 
 213 Id. art. 272 (“Cuando el director tuviere un interés contrario al de la so-
ciedad, deberá hacerlo saber al directorio y a los síndicos y abstenerse de inter-
venir en la deliberación . . . .”). 
 214 Id. art. 273 (“El director no puede participar por cuenta propia o de terce-
ros, en actividades en competencia con la sociedad, salvo autorización expresa 
de la asamblea . . . .”). 
 215 Id. art. 271 (“El director puede celebrar con la sociedad los contratos que 
sean de la actividad en que éste opere y siempre que se concierten en las condi-
ciones del mercado. Los contratos que no reúnan los requisitos del párrafo ante-
rior sólo podrán celebrarse previa aprobación del directorio o conformidad de la 
sindicatura si no existiese quórum. De estas operaciones deberá darse cuenta a la 
asamblea.”). 
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it.216 Nevertheless, the exoneration will founder in the face of an 
encroachment upon legal precepts, the bylaws, or organizational 
norms.217 So will it in case of bankruptcy or if the proprietors of at 
least five percent of the totality of shares object.218 Any such ob-
jector may derivatively process the directorate.219 
Normally, “the organization” may lodge the litigation.220 It 
must first secure the stockholders’ consent, though.221 The consent-
ing resolution leads automatically to the removal and replacement 
of the implicated directors.222 
If the corporation fails to move forward within three months, 
any shareholder may do so in its stead.223 Correlatively, she may 
proceed against the board’s failure.224 Probably, the two proceed-
ings may unfold together, as in a common-law derivative action,225 
or separately. 
                                                                                                             
 216 Id. art. 275 (“La responsabilidad de los directores y gerentes respecto de 
la sociedad, se extingue por aprobación de su gestión o por renuncia expresa o 
transacción, resuelta por la asamblea . . . .”). 
 217 Id. art. 275 (No se extinguirá la “responsabilidad . . . por violación de la 
ley, del estatuto o reglamento.”). 
 218 Id. art. 275 (No se extinguirá la “responsabilidad . . . si . . . media oposi-
ción del cinco por ciento (5 %) del capital social, por lo menos. La extinción es 
ineficaz en caso de liquidación coactiva o concursal.”). 
 219 Id. art. 276 (“La acción social de responsabilidad contra los directores . . . 
podrá ser ejercida por los accionistas que hubieren efectuado la oposición pre-
vista en el artículo 275.”). 
 220 Id. art. 276 (“La acción social de responsabilidad contra los directores 
corresponde a la sociedad . . . .”). 
 221 Id. art. 276 (“La acción social de responsabilidad [requiere una] resolu-
ción de la asamblea de accionistas.”). 
 222 Id. art. 276 (“La resolución producirá la remoción del director o directo-
res afectados y obligará a su reemplazo.”). 
 223 Id. art. 277 (“Si la acción . . . no fuera iniciada dentro del plazo de tres (3) 
meses, contados desde la fecha del acuerdo, cualquier accionista puede promo-
verla . . . .”). 
 224 Id. art. 277 (“[C]ualquier accionista puede promover[] [la acción], sin 
perjuicio de la responsabilidad que resulte del incumplimiento de la medida 
ordenada.”). 
 225 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 639-40 (1986 (“Historically, 
the derivative suit was conceived of as a double suit, or two suits in one: The 
plaintiff (1) brought a suit in equity against the corporation seeking an order 
compelling it (2) to bring a suit for damages or other relief against some third 
person who had caused legal injury to the corporation.”). 
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German “members of the directorate must [likewise] display 
the caution of an orderly and conscientious . . . manager in their 
management.”226 Upon a contravention of their commitments, they 
will answer “jointly and severally” for any “ensuing” detriment.227 
The main burden of proof will rest on them.228 
Directors may not themselves practice a trade or work “in the 
organizational branch of business.”229 They need conciliar consent 
to “direct another trading [firm or to] belong to it as a personally 
liable investor or to its board.”230 In the event of an infringement 
upon these constraints, the concern “may demand indemnifica-
tion.”231 
Upon a plurality vote by the stockholders, the enterprise may 
stake its “compensation claims” against promoters or members of 
the directorate or the council.232 Shareholders owning one per cen-
tum or one-hundred-thousand euros worth of the stock may do the 
honors instead. As a precondition, they must “show that they re-
quested the [entity] to institute the complaint within a reasonable 
time period.”233 Their pleading must additionally adduce “facts 
                                                                                                             
 226 AktG § 93(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Vorstandsmitglieder haben bei ihrer 
Geschäftsführung die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften 
Geschäftsleiters anzuwenden.”). 
 227 Id. § 93(2) (“Vorstandsmitglieder, die ihre Pflichten verletzen, sind der 
Gesellschaft zum Ersatz des daraus entstehenden Schadens als Gesamtschuldner 
verpflichtet.”). 
 228 Id. (“Ist streitig, ob sie die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften 
Geschäftsleiters angewandt haben, so trifft sie die Beweislast.”). 
 229 Id. § 88(1) (“Die Vorstandsmitglieder dürfen ohne Einwilligung des 
Aufsichtsrats . . . im Geschäftszweig der Gesellschaft . . .Geschäfte machen.”). 
 230 Id. (“Sie dürfen ohne Einwilligung auch nicht Mitglied des Vorstands 
oder Geschäftsführer oder persönlich haftender Gesellschafter einer anderen 
Handelsgesellschaft sein.”). 
 231 Id. § 88(2) (“Verstößt ein Vorstandsmitglied gegen dieses Verbot, so 
kann die Gesellschaft Schadenersatz fordern.”). 
 232 Id. § 147(1) (“Die Ersatzansprüche der Gesellschaft aus der Gründung 
gegen die nach den §§ 46 bis 48, 53 verpflichteten Personen oder aus der 
Geschäftsführung gegen die Mitglieder des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats 
oder aus § 117 müssen geltend gemacht werden, wenn es die 
Hauptversammlung mit einfacher Stimmenmehrheit beschließt.”). 
 233 Id. § 148(1)(2) (“Das Gericht lässt die Klage zu, wenn . . . (2) die 
Aktionäre nachweisen, dass sie die Gesellschaft unter Setzung einer 
angemessenen Frist vergeblich aufgefordert haben, selbst Klage zu erheben 
. . . .”). 
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that support the suspicion that the [undertaking] suffered damage 
through dishonesty or a [crass] violation of a statute or the by-
laws.”234 
The company may itself litigate “anytime” and thereupon ren-
der any “pending” derivatively prosecuted lawsuits “inadmissi-
ble.”235 Alternatively, it may take them over.236 In either scenario, 
the original filers may remain aboard,237 perchance as intervenors. 
U.S. jurisdictions appear to specify directorial responsibilities 
judicially rather than legislatively. Somewhat modestly, the New 
Jersey’s supreme jurisdictional forum has required board members 
“to discharge their duties in good faith and with that degree of dili-
gence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise 
under similar circumstances in like positions.”238 The Delawarean 
justices have embraced “the concept of gross negligence as . . . the 
proper standard.”239 They have defined disloyalty as “preferring 
the adverse [interest] of the fiduciary or of a related person to [that] 
of the corporation.”240 
The Model Business Law Act compels a “conflicted director” 
to disclose her conflict to her fellows.241 They must deliberate on 
their own and authorize “the transaction.”242 A “majority” of 
“qualified” investors may also approve after an analogous “disclo-
sure.”243 Beyond this duo of options,244 Delaware statutorily offers 
                                                                                                             
 234 Id. § 148(1)(3) (“Das Gericht lässt die Klage zu, wenn . . . (3) Tatsachen 
vorliegen, die den Verdacht rechtfertigen, dass der Gesellschaft durch 
Unredlichkeit oder grobe Verletzung des Gesetzes oder der Satzung ein Schaden 
entstanden ist . . . .”). 
 235 Id. § 148(3) (“Die Gesellschaft ist jederzeit berechtigt, ihren 
Ersatzanspruch selbst gerichtlich geltend zu machen; mit Klageerhebung durch 
die Gesellschaft wird ein anhängiges Zulassungs- oder Klageverfahren von 
Aktionären über diesen Ersatzanspruch unzulässig.”). 
 236 Id. (“Die Gesellschaft ist nach ihrer Wahl berechtigt, ein anhängiges 
Klageverfahren über ihren Ersatzanspruch in der Lage zu übernehmen . . . .”). 
 237 Id. (“Die bisherigen Antragsteller oder Kläger sind in den Fällen der 
Sätze 1 und 2 beizuladen.”). 
 238 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981). 
 239 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
 240 Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006). 
 241 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.62(a) (2016). 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. § 8.63(a). 
 244 Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 144(a)(1-2). 
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the possibility of establishing fairness to the enterprise and evi-
dencing approval, not necessarily under the described conditions, 
“by the board . . .  , a committee” or the stockholders.245 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, in turn, presupposes that 
in the ordinary course, concerns should “properly assert” their own 
claims.246 It exceptionally empowers a shareholder to press the 
latter, including those against board members.247 When so doing, 
she must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of . . . simi-
larly situated” investors.248 The plaintiff must “state with particu-
larity any effort” to urge the entity toward the courthouse or “the 
reasons for not” exerting herself to that end.249 
The adjudicator must sign off on any settlement, voluntarily 
dismissal, or compromise.250 Besides, the Delawarean top tribunal 
has declared that: “After an objective and thorough investigation of 
[any such] derivative suit, an independent [corporate] committee 
may . . . file a pretrial motion to dismiss . . . .”251 The trier must 
“give special consideration to matters of law and public policy in 
addition to the [enterprise’s] best interests.”252 
Expectedly, Argentina and Germany seem to set a stricter pru-
dence-yardstick than the various U.S. states. Thereby, they come 
across as slightly less friendly to directorates. The Argentine en-
actment delves into the procedural particulars. Its German equiva-
lent does not, while appearing to outdo the regimes enacted 
throughout the United States in hindering complainants. Accord-
ingly, the latter must prove a directorial defendant dishonest or 
grossly in breach of internal or statutory strictures. Furthermore, 
the organization may readily wrest the cause from the stockholding 
suitors. These hindrances might reflect serious skepticism in Ger-
many vis-à-vis collective claimants. 
                                                                                                             
 245 Id. § 144(a)(3). 
 246 See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 23.1(a). 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 23.1(b)(3). 
 250 Id. 23.1(c). 
 251 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981). 
 252 Id. at 789. 
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SHAREHOLDERS 
(0) Ultimately, shareholders stand as owners of the venture. 
Still, they must exercise their ownership through or against the 
directorial mediation. This portion of the discussion will explore a 
quintet of their essential entitlements. 
(1) An Argentine investor—like the “directorate,” supervisory 
councilors, or trustees—may convene her fellows to meet, whether 
ordinarily or extraordinarily. Yet, to do so, her investment must 
minimally add up to five percent of the total.253 The shareholding 
group decides by a majority of all voters or shares, respectively, (a) 
whatever it may regularly resolve (unless the bylaws mandate a 
larger margin)254 or (b) any “transformation,” “dissolution,” “shift 
to a foreign domicile,” or basic change of the corporate object. It 
may ratify a “merger” or “breakup” by a plurality of the enfran-
chised stock.255 Anyone who disagrees with the determination to 
undertake such transcendental transactions, excepting that of dis-
solving, merging, or breaking up the corporation, may return her 
holdings for a full “reimbursement.”256 
                                                                                                             
 253 L. 19550 arts. 236, 281(b), 294(7) (Arg.) (1984) (“Las asambleas ordina-
rias y extraordinarias serán convocadas por el directorio o el síndico en los casos 
previstos por la ley, o cuando cualquiera de ellos lo juzgue necesario o cuando 
sean requeridas por accionistas que representan por lo menos el cinco por ciento 
(5 %) del capital social . . . .”) (“Son funciones del consejo de vigilancia: . . . (b) 
Convocará la asamblea cuando estime conveniente o lo requieran accionistas 
. . . .”) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (7) Convocar a asamblea 
extraordinaria, cuando lo juzgue necesario y a asamblea ordinaria o asambleas 
especiales, cuando omitiere hacerlo el directorio . . . .”). 
 254 Id. arts. 243, 244 (“Las resoluciones [de la asamblea ordinaria] serán 
tomadas por mayoría absoluta de los votos presentes que puedan emitirse en la 
respectiva decisión, salvo cuando el estatuto exija mayor número.”) (“Las reso-
luciones [de la asamblea extraordinaria] serán tomadas por mayoría absoluta de 
los votos presentes que puedan emitirse en la respectiva decisión, salvo cuando 
el estatuto exija mayor número.”). 
 255 Id. art. 244 (“Cuando se tratare de la transformación, . . . de la disolución 
anticipada de la sociedad; de la transferencia del domicilio al extranjero, del 
cambio fundamental del objeto . . . , las resoluciones se adoptarán por el voto 
favorable de la mayoría de acciones con derecho a voto, sin aplicarse la plurali-
dad de voto. Esta disposición se aplicará para decidir la fusión y la escisión 
. . . .”). 
 256 Id. art. 245 (“Los accionistas disconformes con las modificaciones inclui-
das en el último párrafo del artículo anterior, salvo en el caso de disolución anti-
cipada y en el de los accionistas de la sociedad incorporante en fusión y en la 
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In Germany, the directorate convokes the stockholders.257 It 
must, as the supervisory council, show up along with them.258 
They may then plurally pass their own regular “resolutions,” unless 
an enactment establishes otherwise or the bylaws do.259 An altera-
tion of the latter rides by default on the endorsement of “three-
fourths” of the voters.260 So does a disbandment,261 as well as a 
combination.262 
Similarly, the Delawarean “board” determines the “place” and 
“the manner” in which the shareholders gather.263 It also calls spe-
cially scheduled meetings.264 In general, investors “act” by majori-
ty.265 On the other hand, they may usually elect their directorial 
delegates “by a plurality.”266 
(2) Stockholders in Argentina may seemingly perform their 
acts by consenting. After all, they need not assemble by publicized 
convention if they unanimously support whatever they are to re-
                                                                                                             
escisión, pueden separarse de la sociedad con reembolso del valor de sus accio-
nes.”). 
 257 AktG § 121(2) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Hauptversammlung wird durch den 
Vorstand einberufen . . . .”). 
 258 Id. § 118(3) (“Die Mitglieder des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats sollen 
an der Hauptversammlung teilnehmen.”). 
 259 Id. § 133(1) (“Die Beschlüsse der Hauptversammlung bedürfen der 
Mehrheit der abgegebenen Stimmen (einfache Stimmenmehrheit), soweit nicht 
Gesetz oder Satzung eine größere Mehrheit oder weitere Erfordernisse 
bestimmen.”). 
 260 Id. § 179(2) (“Der Beschluß der Hauptversammlung bedarf [bei 
Satzungsänderungen] einer Mehrheit, die mindestens drei Viertel des bei der 
Beschlußfassung vertretenen Grundkapitals umfaßt.”). 
 261 Id. § 262(1)(2) (“Die Aktiengesellschaft wird aufgelöst durch Beschluß 
der Hauptversammlung; dieser bedarf einer Mehrheit, die mindestens drei 
Viertel des bei der Beschlußfassung vertretenen Grundkapitals umfaßt; die 
Satzung kann eine größere Kapitalmehrheit und weitere Erfordernisse 
bestimmen . . . .”). 
 262 Id. § 319(2) (“Der Beschluß über die Zustimmung [zu einer 
Eingliederung] bedarf einer Mehrheit, die mindestens drei Viertel des bei der 
Beschlußfassung vertretenen Grundkapitals umfaßt. Die Satzung kann eine 
größere Kapitalmehrheit und weitere Erfordernisse bestimmen.”). 
 263 Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 211(a)(1). 
 264 Id. § 211(d). 
 265 Id. § 216(2). 
 266 Id. § 216(3). 
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solve.267 Granted, the regulatory regimen seems to presuppose a 
face-to-face gathering. Sensibly interpreted, though, it would co-
here with shareholders simply voicing their unanimous consensus 
on paper. 
Under the German legislation, “[t]he bylaws may envisage [an 
investor] casting [her] vote by written or electronic communica-
tion.”268 They might conceivably acquiesce in everyone doing so. 
Of course, “[t]he directors and councilors must . . . participate in 
the assembly,” at least by “video- and audio-broadcast.”269 Regard-
less, they could all presumably broadcast in this fashion to settle 
concrete issues or could even skip the pointless ritual altogether 
whenever none of their constituents would be putting in an appear-
ance anyway. 
Delaware, for its part, unequivocally contemplates stockholders 
playing their active role “without . . . meeting, without prior no-
tice,” “and without” voting.270 It just necessitates “consents in writ-
ing . . . signed by the holders of outstanding stock [with no] less 
than the minimum number of votes . . . necessary to authorize such 
action.”271 The highest jurisdictional forum has proclaimed these 
options “fundamental . . . rights guaranteed by statute.”272 
(3) The Argentine paradigm preferentially invites shareholders 
to buy “new shares of the same class in proportion to the stock that 
[they] already own.”273 It does as much regarding “debentures 
                                                                                                             
 267 L. 19550 art. 237 (Arg.) (1984) (“La asamblea podrá celebrarse sin publi-
cación de la convocatoria cuando se reúnan accionistas que representen la totali-
dad del capital social y las decisiones . . . se adopten por unanimidad de las ac-
ciones con derecho a voto.”). 
 268 AktG § 118(2) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Satzung kann vorsehen . . . , dass 
Aktionäre ihre Stimmen, auch ohne an der Versammlung teilzunehmen, 
schriftlich oder im Wege elektronischer Kommunikation abgeben dürfen . . . .”). 
 269 Id. § 118(3) (“Die Mitglieder des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats sollen 
an der Hauptversammlung teilnehmen. Die Satzung kann jedoch bestimmte 
Fälle vorsehen, in denen die Teilnahme von Mitgliedern des Aufsichtsrats im 
Wege der Bild- und Tonübertragung erfolgen darf.”). 
 270 Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 228. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 1985). 
 273 L. 19550 art. 194 (Arg.) (1984) (“Las acciones ordinarias, sean de voto 
simple o plural, otorgan a su titular el derecho preferente a la suscripción de 
nuevas acciones de la misma clase en proporción a las que posea . . . .”). 
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convertible into shares.”274 Accordingly, an investor with ten per 
centum of a stock possesses a prerogative of first refusal with re-
spect to an equivalent percentage of any identically classified 
shares that the corporation may freshly proffer. 
Consequently, corporations must honor the claim to a propor-
tionate partaking in the business. They may limit or eliminate it 
only on an individual basis, as an exception, under the compulsion 
of their own well-being, and with regard to stock either “distribut-
ed in payment of pre-existing debts” or “to be paid in kind.”275 
Such limitation or elimination would require the approval of a pre-
ponderance of the totality of shares during an extraordinary stock-
holder meeting.276 
Likewise, German law welcomes shareholders, “upon [their] 
request,” to purchase any fresh stock in relation to that previously 
sitting in their portfolio.277 It affords them “up to two weeks” to 
request their due.278 In contrast, an investor in the United States 
must evidently protect her “personal interest in maintaining the 
                                                                                                             
 274 Id. (“Los accionistas tendrán también derecho preferente a la suscripción 
de debentures convertibles en acciones.”); id. art. 334(1) (“Cuando los debentu-
res sean convertibles en acciones: (1) Los accionistas . . . gozarán de preferencia 
para su suscripción en proporción a las acciones que posean, con derecho de 
acrecer . . . .”). 
 275 Id. art. 197 (“La asamblea extraordinaria . . . puede resolver en casos 
particulares y excepcionales, cuando el interés de la sociedad lo exija, la limita-
ción o suspensión del derecho de preferencia en la suscripción de nuevas accio-
nes, bajo las condiciones siguientes: . . . 2) Que se trate de acciones a integrarse 
con aportes en especie o que se den en pago de obligaciones preexistentes.”); id. 
art. 194 (“Los derechos [de preferencia] no pueden ser suprimidos o condiciona-
dos, salvo lo dispuesto en el artículo 197 . . . .”). 
 276 Id. art. 197 (“La asamblea extraordinaria, con las mayorías del último 
párrafo del artículo 244, puede resolver . . . la limitación o suspensión del dere-
cho de preferencia en la suscripción de nuevas acciones . . . .”); id. art. 235(5) 
(“Corresponden a la asamblea extraordinaria . . . (5) Limitación o suspensión del 
derecho de preferencia en la suscripción de nuevas acciones conforme al artículo 
197 . . . .”); id. art. 244 (En estos casos, “las resoluciones se adoptarán por el 
voto favorable de la mayoría de acciones con derecho a voto, sin aplicarse la 
pluralidad de voto.”). 
 277 AktG § 186(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Jedem Aktionär muß auf sein Verlangen 
ein seinem Anteil an dem bisherigen Grundkapital entsprechender Teil der 
neuen Aktien zugeteilt werden.”). 
 278 Id. (“Für die Ausübung des Bezugsrechts ist eine Frist von mindestens 
zwei Wochen zu bestimmen.”). 
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balance of power . . . in [a closely held corporation] by special 
provisions in the corporate articles or bylaws or in [stockholder] 
agreements.”279 Hence, she must contractually coerce the offer of 
“any shares [on sale] to the corporation or pro rata to all . . . share-
holders.”280 
Nevertheless, the top tribunal in Massachusetts might have sig-
naled an alternative take on the matter by faithfully and reciprocal-
ly obliging investors. It enunciated in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home, Inc. that “stockholders in the close corporation owe one 
another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of 
the enterprise [as] partners [do].”281 In light of this enunciation, 
maybe they must preserve the ratio of each other’s investment. In 
the next breath, the opinion acknowledges that elsewhere “courts 
[have] fairly consistently” rejected its posture out of a disinclina-
tion “to interfere in those facets of internal corporate [dealings 
that] essentially involve management decisions subject to the prin-
ciple of majority control.”282 
(4) A shareholder in Argentina statutorily enjoys a right of ex-
amination. She may pore over “the organization’s [accounts] and 
papers and entreat managers for reports that [she deems] rele-
vant.”283 However, investors appear to benefit from no such guar-
anty in companies with a supervisory council or trustees.284 Appar-
ently, they may not access corporate archives on their own in pub-
                                                                                                             
 279 See, e.g., Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Or. 1977). 
 280 Id. 
 281 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc, 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 
1976) (quoting Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 
N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975)). 
 282 Id. at 662. 
 283 L. 19550 art. 55 (Arg.) (1984) (“Los socios pueden examinar los libros y 
papeles sociales y recabar del administrador los informes que estimen pertinen-
tes.”). 
 284 Id. (“[No] corresponde a los socios de sociedades por acciones [el dere-
cho de contralor], salvo el supuesto del último párrafo del artículo 284.”); id. art. 
284 (“Las sociedades que no estén comprendidas en ninguno de los supuestos a 
que se refiere el artículo 299 . . . , podrán prescindir de la sindicatura cuando así 
esté previsto en el estatuto. En tal caso los socios poseen el derecho de contralor 
que confiere el artículo 55.”). 
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lic or large companies, which must internally instate overseers,285 
or in small corporations that opt for such instatement. Problemati-
cally, a stockholder perhaps cannot acquire access to pertinent data 
upon a suspicion that the bodies in charge of oversight are neglect-
ing their function or conspiring with the administration to her det-
riment. At most, she could sue them. 
In Germany, the directorate must deliver “information on or-
ganizational affairs to the extent imperative for the appropriate 
assessment of agenda items” that shareholders plan to discuss upon 
meeting.286 It must do so “in accordance with the precepts of con-
scientious and faithful accountability”287 but “may refuse [in a 
managerially reasonable attempt to thwart] considerable disad-
vantage to the organization.”288 Under the Delawarean regime, an 
investor may, through a document “under oath,” demand “to in-
spect for any proper purpose . . . [t]he corporation’s stock ledger, a 
list of its stockholders, and its other books and records.”289 Specifi-
cally, she must aver an end “reasonably related to [her] interest as 
a” shareholder.290 Upon a declination, she may judicially “compel 
[the] inspection.”291 
(5) An Argentine corporation may issue preferred shares entail-
ing a priority claim to dividend disbursements.292 It may divest 
                                                                                                             
 285 Id. art. 158 (“La sindicatura o el consejo de vigilancia son obligatorios en 
la sociedad cuyo capital alcance el importe fijado por el artículo 299, inciso 
(2).”). 
 286 AktG § 131(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Jedem Aktionär ist auf Verlangen in der 
Hauptversammlung vom Vorstand Auskunft über Angelegenheiten der 
Gesellschaft zu geben, soweit sie zur sachgemäßen Beurteilung des Gegenstands 
der Tagesordnung erforderlich ist.”). 
 287 Id. § 131(2) (“Die Auskunft hat den Grundsätzen einer gewissenhaften 
und getreuen Rechenschaft zu entsprechen.”). 
 288 Id. § 131(3)(1) (“Der Vorstand darf die Auskunft verweigern, (1) soweit 
die Erteilung der Auskunft nach vernünftiger kaufmännischer Beurteilung 
geeignet ist, der Gesellschaft . . . einen nicht unerheblichen Nachteil zuzufügen 
. . . .”). 
 289 Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 220(b)(1). 
 290 Id. § 220(b). 
 291 Id. § 220(c)). 
 292 L. 19550 art. 17 (Arg.) (1984) (Heading: “Acciones preferidas: derecho 
de voto”). 
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them of the franchise.293 Notwithstanding, the purchaser may at-
tend ordinary and extraordinary meetings along with everybody 
else.294 Furthermore, she may vote exceptionally when her nonpre-
ferred counterparts are deliberating to divide up, combine, or wind 
down the company or to change cardinally its declared objective, 
domicile it abroad, or postpone preferences on dividends.295 
Various German statutory sections equally envision stock pre-
ferred on “the distribution of profits.”296 They allow its issuance 
without any voting privileges and as a maximum up to “half of the 
corporate capital.”297 The shares at stake attain suffrage during 
nonpayment of “the preferential amount,” while approving addi-
tional ones of their sort, or upon revocation of their “prefer-
ence.”298 
Delaware, in turn, provides for “preferred . . . stock . . . entitled 
to receive [preferential] dividends . . . as [defined] in the certificate 
of incorporation or in [an enabling] resolution . . . by the board of 
directors.”299 Therefore, it ostensibly accords corporations plenty 
of latitude on the definition. Nonetheless, they must permit pre-
ferred investors “to vote as a class upon a proposed amendment 
[that] would [adversely alter] the . . . number [or benefits] of [any] 
shares [with preference.]” 300 
(1-5) On all five fronts except the third (pertaining to the 
preservation of proprietary proportionality), Argentina and Germa-
                                                                                                             
 293 Id. (“Las acciones con preferencia patrimonial pueden carecer de voto, 
excepto para las materias incluidas en el cuarto párrafo del artículo 244, sin 
perjuicio de su derecho de asistir a las asambleas con voz.”) 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. 
 296 AktG § 12(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Vorzugsaktien können nach den 
Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes als Aktien ohne Stimmrecht ausgegeben werden.); 
id. § 139(1) (“Für Aktien, die mit einem Vorzug bei der Verteilung des Gewinns 
ausgestattet sind, kann das Stimmrecht ausgeschlossen werden (Vorzugsaktien 
ohne Stimmrecht).”). 
 297 Id. § 139(2) (“Vorzugsaktien ohne Stimmrecht dürfen nur bis zur Hälfte 
des Grundkapitals ausgegeben werden.”). 
 298 Id. § 140(2) (“Ist der Vorzug nachzuzahlen und wird der Vorzugsbetrag 
in einem Jahr nicht . . . gezahlt . . . , so haben die Aktionäre das Stimmrecht, bis 
die Rückstände gezahlt sind.”); id. § 141(4) (“Ist der Vorzug aufgehoben, so 
gewähren die Aktien das Stimmrecht.”) 
 299 Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 151(c). 
 300 Id. § 242 (b)(2). 
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ny seem to treat a stockholder overall as in the United States. Sim-
ultaneously, they appear to exhibit less flexibility toward the cor-
poration. Facially, the Delawarean codification countenances com-
panies configuring their shareholder meetings and preferential 
stock to a greater degree as they see fit. It more clearly releases 
them from the onus of meeting live, pledging themselves to pro-
portional participation, and opening their files in the absence of an 
appropriate aim. 
EPILOGUE 
This piece has discerned the Latin American and Continental 
European from the U.S. regulation of incorporated companies. It 
has spotlighted how one and the other structure themselves as well 
as handle incorporation, incorporators, piercing, governance, disci-
pline, and shareholders. They both rely, certainly, on legislation 
and adjudication in their regulatory exertions yet do so differently, 
qualitatively in addition to quantitatively. 
Apparently, civil and common law continue to specialize re-
spectively though not exclusively in statutes and binding prece-
dents. Still, they ever more frequently intrude into each other’s 
apparent specialty, while leaving their own imprint on it. The ten-
dency to converge coexists with that to diverge. 
This general difference, in tandem with the correlative concur-
rence, has evolved immemorially, growing in nuances and excep-
tions. Absent unexpected cataclysms, it should persist down this 
path into the future. So will its more specific counterparts, high-
lighted throughout the just wrapped-up discussion. They equally 
insinuate a somewhat tentative, simplistic, distorting picture of 
contrasts and similarities. 
So depicted, Latin America and Continental Europe seem to 
foment jurisdictional diversity, concentrate on compliance, en-
throne an ever-present state, evoke the concept of the collective 
good, and dedicate themselves to stakeholders. On the other hand, 
the United States appears to compel convergence among compet-
ing jurisdictions, focus on flexibility or user-friendliness, kowtow 
to an all-powerful corporation (or directorate), wave the flag of 
individualism or efficiency, and consecrate itself to stockholders. 
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Expectedly, this seeming opposition on specifics will likewise en-
dure and modulate alongside any collateral conjunction. 
